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INTRODUCTION
Financial deregulation was justified both before and dur-
ing the presidency of Ronald Reagan by the premise that re-
duced government regulation would encourage competition
between financial institutions, thereby increasing market
choices for large and small savers alike. Regulations limiting
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lending and depository interest rates were seen as the primary
obstacle to an unfettered free market despite the fact that such
legal restraints on the price of credit were the linchpin in a
regulatory regime that had provided stability in banking and
finance for almost half a century.
Increased price competition was considered a public good
because of its presumed beneficial effects upon consumer
choice, economic efficiency, resource allocation and growth.
Competitive forces, once unleashed, brought higher returns to
depositors as commercial banks, savings and loan associations,
and credit unions found themselves in the same environment
as previously unregulated money markets such as the Eurodol-
lar and mutual fund markets. According to this free-market
blueprint, higher interest rates on deposits would encourage
increased private thrift and savings which, guided by an invisi-
ble free hand, would flow into investment of new capital, plant
and equipment. Americans would become more productive at
home and more competitive abroad.
All this was fantasy. In no other major area of policy dur-
ing the Reagan era did theory depart more from reality. From
its start, financial deregulation was a policy based upon logical
and ideological contradictions. Increased interest rates to de-
positors meant more burdensome lending rates for public and
private borrowers, particularly at a time when the central
monetary authority at the Federal Reserve System (the "Fed")
had restricted the total supply of credit. By the end of his first
administration, Ronald Reagan had succeeded in ratifying the
most radical transformations of American banking since the
New Deal: virtually all restrictions on the price of credit were
abolished. By the end of President Reagan's second term in
office, the advocates of free-market capitalism were quietly
relying on massive government interventions and a policy of
financial bailout to safeguard the entire monetary payment
system.
In analyzing the legislative and regulatory development of
U.S. banking and finance policy, this Article considers a range
of empirical evidence and realities. Such an empirical method-
ology has been embraced over the years by widely disparate
schools of legal thought.' Most recently, this methodology has
I For instance, the "empirically oriented wing" of the critical legal studies
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been associated with the 'law and economics" school, which
explicitly recognizes the importance of using empirical evidence
to analyze legislative strategies.2 This Article considers and
evaluates relevant empirical evidence, including indicators of
macroeconomic performance3  and microeconomic perfor-
mance.4 As this Article suggests, consideration of such empiri-
cal realities requires lawyers and policy-makers to engage se-
riously with scholars in the disciplines of economics and the
various social sciences.
I. THE REGULATORY REGIME: 1933-79
Most Americans are not old enough to remember a time
when there was a banking crisis so severe that not a single
bank was open for business in the entire country. Such was
the reality confronting Americans when President Franklin D.
Roosevelt took his first oath of office on March 4, 1933, and
issued a proclamation providing for a nationwide bank holi-
day.5 Confidence in the banking and credit system had degen-
erated, resulting at first in isolated runs of depositors and
finally mass panic and the brink of financial collapse.
The magnitude of the financial crisis presented Roosevelt
with the opportunity for major reform of the banking system.
Within days of his inauguration, President Roosevelt signed
the Emergency Banking Act of 1933. The Act prohibited the
movement can be traced back to the "fresh look" methodological approach of Karl
Llewellyn and the neo-realists. Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From
Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670 n.5,
1671 n.10 (1981).
2RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995). Judge Posner rightly warns
against the tired tendency of legal scholars to produce self-referential scholarship:
law review articles that merely cite ad nauseum to other law review articles that
fail to consider empirical reality or to develop analytical frameworks for evaluating
empirical evidence.
' Macroeconomic indicators include rates of interest, inflation and economic
growth, changes in the size of the federal deficit and national debt, and changes
in the distribution of national wealth and income.
' Microeconomic indicators include changes in the profitability of commercial
banking, the scope and frequency of financial failure, the magnitude of the collapse
of the savings and loan industry, and the scope of government bailouts, rescue
packages and market interventions.
' Similar proclamations and orders had already been issued by the Governors
in every state. LESTER V. CHANDLER, THE EcONoMICS OF MONEY AND BANKING
327 (9th ed. 1969).
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payment of interest on demand deposits (checking accounts),
raised minimum capital requirements for federally chartered
banks,6 and provided the statutory authority for the Federal
Reserve Board to implement Regulation Q, which set maxi-
mum interest rates payable on time deposits such as savings
accounts.7
Underlying the New Deal reform plan was the widespread
perception that unrestrained competition had destroyed public
confidence in the entire banking industry during the Great
Depression. In an effort to attract funds in the 1920s, banks
had bid up the rate of depository interest payments to exces-
sive levels. "To cover the cost of these funds, the banks in turn
were obliged to invest their resources on terms which sacrificed
asset quality for yield."' The "competitive escalation of interest
rates paid on deposits," which had induced lenders to make
riskier loans at higher interest rates, ultimately became a
major factor in the 1930-33 wave of business failures, mortgage
foreclosures and bank closings.9
For nearly half a century, beginning in 1933, American
banking was shielded from the most extreme excesses of price
competition."0 The depository interest rate ceilings performed
EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 41 (2d ed. 1984).
The Banking Act of 1935 extended parts of the federal regulatory scheme to state-
chartered banks and empowered the Federal Reserve to set reserve requirements
on time and savings deposits. Id.
' Thomas F. Huertas, The Regulation of Financial Institutions: A Historical
Perspective on Current Issues, in FINANCIAL SERVICES 6, 20-22 (George J. Benston
ed., 1983). Similarly, the FDIC implemented FDIC Regulation 329 to impose inter-
est rate ceilings on non-Federal Reserve-member banks. CARTER H. GOLEMBE &
RAYMOND E. HENGREN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 54 (1975). For much of
the post-World War II era, the Regulation Q interest rate ceilings on passbook
savings accounts were kept low, often between three and five percent, thereby al-
lowing banks to lend at low interest rates while still remaining profitable. The
regulatory authority to set depository interest rate ceilings was not made perma-
nent, but was subject to periodic review and extension by Congress. Id. at 55.
8 GOLEMBE & HENGREN, supra note 7, at 54. Note the strong similarity be-
tween the 1920s and the speculative 1980s, when once again banks (as well as
savings and loan associations) "sacrificed asset quality for yield" by lending at
high interest rates and dealing in high interest junk bonds. Id.
' The Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1347
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1979) (statement of Henry
B. Schechter, Director, AFL-CIO Dep't of Urban Affairs) [hereinafter Statement of
Henry Schechter].
" The "New Economics" of John Maynard Keynes provided the intellectual
[Vol. 60: 1295
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a variety of functions that served as the basis of financial sta-
bility in the United States. These ceilings provided stability by
limiting the degree of price competition between banks and
other financial institutions, allowing the banking system to
expand credit without raising interest rates on loans," and
maintaining the existing distribution of wealth and income
between debtors and creditors. The Federal Reserve's Regula-
tion Q was the cornerstone of the federal government's efforts
to enforce a stable depository interest rate environment. State
usury laws, in turn, limited interest rates on loans while pro-
viding banks with a comfortable margin for profit. 2
During these years, banking became a conservative "3-6-3"
business: bankers paid out 3% nominal interest to attract de-
posits, lent the deposits out at 6%, and headed for the golf
course at 3 in the afternoon. Prudence was valued more than
risk, and competition for deposits was restricted to the provi-
sion of branches and other services, including customary offers
of free toasters. Freedom of contract between depositors and
bankers took a back seat to considerations of bank safety and
financial stability.
support for much of New Deal banking policy. Keynes himself concluded that 'the
rate of interest is not self-adjusting at a level best suited to the social advantage
but constantly tends to rise too high, so that a wise Government is concerned to
curb it by statute [i.e., usury laws] and custom and even by invoking the sanc-
tions of the moral law." JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 351 (1st ed. 1964).
" Under Regulation Q, the Federal Reserve was able to slow the expansion of
credit by lowering the depository interest rate ceilings, thereby limiting the ability
of banks to attract funds. See CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 113-14; WILLIAM
GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 177-78 (1987). The repeal of Regulation Q ham-
pered the Federal Reserve Board's monetary control capabilities by requiring high-
er interest rates to achieve the Federal Reserve's policy goal of zero inflation.
According to Michael Mussa, director of research at the International Monetary
Fund, some central banks now have to raise interest rates twice as much as they
once had to in order to reduce inflationary pressures. Steven Greenhouse, Central-
Bank Gripes About a New World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at D1.
In addition, the federal government pursued other policies intended to foster
an allocation of credit more favorable to construction of new housing. C. Thomas
Long et al., Enhancing the Value of the Thrift Franchise: A Possible Solution for
the Dilemma of the FSLIC, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 385, 399 (1988). The Federal
Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 provided for the chartering of savings and loan
associations and for tax incentives to reward home mortgage finance. Id. at 389.
The Interest Rate Adjustment Act of 1966 allowed thrift institutions to pay slight-
ly higher rates for deposits than could commercial banks. Richard L. Peterson,
Consumer Finance, in FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 7, at 199.
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While depositors earned less on their savings under this
regime, low interest rates on loans fostered investment, em-
ployment and income. Banks enjoyed high-quality loan portfo-
lios and far fewer failures. For example, from 1930 to 1933
more than 9000 commercial banks failed, causing devastating
effects upon the public's confidence in the entire system of
monetary payments. In contrast, from 1934 to 1973 only 641
U.S. banks were closed, an average of less than seventeen a
year. 
3
The Federal Reserve Board, in its role as central bank (the
banker's bank and lender of last resort) and marketplace regu-
lator, became the institutional focal point for enforcing the
New Deal regulatory model. Throughout this long period of
banking stability, the Federal Reserve would make periodic
adjustments to Regulation Q to achieve the sometimes conflict-
ing policy objectives of "maximum employment, production,
and purchasing power." 4 However, the intricate system of
regulated depository interest rates depended upon the mainte-
nance of low market interest rates to prevent depositors from
shifting funds from banks and thrifts to higher-yielding gov-
ernment securities or money markets. The Federal Reserve
achieved this policy initially by "pegging" yields on government
securities to levels below the Regulation Q ceilings. 5
From 1942 to 1951, the Federal Reserve pursued a low
interest rate policy by supplying funds to anyone presenting
government securities at the pegged prices-ranging from
three-eighths of one percent on 90-day maturities to a max-
imum of 2.5% on 25-year Treasury bonds. 6 The real rate of
GOLEMBE & HENGREN, supra note 7, at 30.
14 These policy objectives were ultimately embodied in the Employment Act of
1946. CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 495. In addition, the Federal Reserve made ad-
justments to discount rates, reserve requirements (Regulation D), and imposed
selective credit controls through Regulation W, which was implemented to impede
the growth of consumer credit in an overheated economy by regulating minimum
down payments and maximum periods of repayment.
's CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 527-28.
Such a "pegged" interest rate policy was designed to reduce the costs of
financing the federal government's debt while maintaining the price of government
securities, thereby sustaining public confidence in the financial institutions that
held large amounts of government debt. CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 487-88.
The architects of the Federal Reserve's "pegging" policy correctly recognized
that a successful war effort meant the full employment and mobilization of
society's human and capital resources, requiring the maintenance of low real inter-
[Vol. 60: 12951300
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interest-the nominal market interest rate minus the inflation
rate-was even lower. The Fed actively used its authority to
set low interest rates for depositors and marketplace alike, de-
spite a federal deficit almost five times larger and national
debt nearly two and one-half times larger, than those of the
1980s (as a percentage of U.S. Gross Domestic Product).' The
experience clearly demonstrated the Federal Reserve's ability
to peg interest rates at levels low enough to discourage efforts
to evade Regulation Q through the proliferation of "money
substitutes."
A creature of the Wilsonian period of reform, the Federal
Reserve System originally was subject to some measure of
public democratic control. The Secretary of the Treasury and
Comptroller of the Currency were permanent members of the
Federal Reserve's seven-member governing board" until the
est rates and strategic controls of credit and prices when markets either became
too tight or were inherently non-competitive. Since the Federal Reserve ended its
pegging policy, the U.S. economy has experienced a significant secular decline in
its capacity utilization rates for human and capital resources. A revival of the
regulatory regime-characterized by selective credit controls, interest rate ceilings,
low inflation, and full utilization and employment of human and capital resourc-
es-is a necessary prerequisite to success on more modern war fronts, such as the
nation's unfinished wars on poverty, drugs and violent crime.
17 In 1943, the federal budget deficit was 31.1% of Gross Domestic Product
("GDP"). By 1946, the gross federal debt was 127.5% of GDP. PRESIDENT'S COUN-
CIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT: 1993, at 438
(1993) (Table B-76) [hereinafter 1993 ECONOMIC REPORT]. Yet during this same
period of time interest rates were pegged within the range of three-eighths of one
percent to 2.5% on government securities. Id. at 428 (Table B-69); CHANDLER,
supra note 5, at 487-88. In contrast, during the Reagan era the federal budget
deficit was never larger than 6.3% of GDP (fiscal year 1983) and the gross federal
debt was never larger than 55.4% of GDP (fiscal year 1989), although real and
market interest rate yields on government securities were many times higher than
during the 1940s. 1993 ECONOMIC REPORT, supra, at 438 (Table B-76). Likewise,
today the federal budget deficit is down to 3.1% of GDP, while the gross federal
debt is 70% of GDP. But both real and market interest rates are far higher than
during the 1940s. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT: 1995, at 366 (1995) (Table B-78). Such empirical data suggests
a cause-and-effect relationship that is at odds with the conventional economic
wisdom that our present-day deficits are the cause of high interest rates. Rather,
high interest rates have generated deficit borrowing to finance both public and
private debt. The "passive deficits" of the 1980s and 1990s represent insufficient
investment in the real economy, unlike the "active deficits" of the 1940s that fi-
nanced military campaigns and domestic economic development alike.
" President Woodrow Wilson hailed the 1913 Federal Reserve Act as a tri-
umph over the "money trust." GREIDER, supra note 11, at 277-78. Wilson declared
that control of the banking system must be "public, not private," and "must be
1995]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
1935 Banking Act stripped both officials of their Federal Re-
serve Board memberships, effectively leaving the Board under
the strong influence of private commercial bankers. Thereafter,
to meet the necessities of economic crisis and war-time mobili-
zation, democratic influence on Federal Reserve policy depend-
ed almost entirely on President Roosevelt's personal and politi-
cal alliance with Federal Reserve Board Chairman Marriner
Eccles. 9
The war ended, prosperity returned and eventually the
Federal Reserve's ability to set low interest rates was eclipsed
by a poverty of institutional will. The accumulation of private
factional interests overwhelmed the public policy objectives of
the Federal Reserve. Reflecting the position of its commercial
banking and bondholding constituencies, the Federal Reserve
was anxious to end the low interest rate regime. The Fed was
particularly motivated by the mild price escalation which had
driven the real interest rate on short-term government securi-
ties to low and even negative levels, creating a situation where
savers essentially subsidized borrowers. The Federal Reserve-
Treasury Accord of 1951 finally freed the Fed from its pegging
policy.20
vested in the Government itself, so that the banks must be the instruments, not
the masters, of business." AUGUST HECKSCHER, WOODROW WILSON 318 (1991).
19 GREIDER, supra note 11, at 312. The confusing structure of the Federal Re-
serve System seems designed to provide political accountability in appearance but
not in reality. The Federal Reserve System consists of a seven-member Board of
Governors and a 12-member Federal Open Market Committee ("FOMC"), which
sets interest rates and monetary policy for the nation. While the Board's
Chairman and Vice-Chairman are appointed for four-year terms, the remaining
board members are appointed to terms of 14 years, longer than three presidential
administrations. The FOMC consists of the seven members of the Board of Gover-
nors and the presidents of five of the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks. Unlike
board members, the appointment of the regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents
are not approved by Congress. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 4-7 (7th ed.
1984) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM].
" CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 493. The so-called "independence" of the Federal
Reserve's decision-making process did not insulate it from politics, but merely
dictated an outcome most favorable to certain private banking interests. Unfor-
tunately, such an historic turning point in the nation's monetary policy failed to
elicit any significant public debate. Congressional oversight of the Federal Reserve
System existed more in form than in substance despite numerous legislative pro-
posals over the years to reorganize the Federal Reserve to make it more account-
able to a wider range of interests (i.e., debtor groups such as consumers, farmers
and manufacturing businesses).
[Vol. 60: 12951302
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Over the course of the next three decades, the Federal
Reserve allowed real yields on government securities to rise
steadily even as federal deficit spending declined as a percent-
age of Gross Domestic Product.21 The secular rise in interest
rates contributed to higher levels of both unemployment and
cost-push inflation.22 Money became more expensive, and the
American dream receded further out of reach for the next gen-
eration.
Not surprisingly, as market interest rates rose during the
1960s and 1970s, the banking industry extensively lobbied the
Fed to raise Regulation Q. Those ceilings were progressively
relaxed as large institutional savers sought higher market
yields by purchasing government debt or money market funds.
Ironically, the Fed itself had created this situation by abandon-
ing its policy of setting market interest rates at levels below
the Regulation Q ceilings. As market interest rates rose above
the mandated ceilings, and unregulated offshore money mar-
kets began to compete with the regulated domestic environ-
ment, political and market pressures to dismantle the New
Deal regulatory regime grew steadily.
II. CHALLENGES TO LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE REGULATORY
REGIME
A. Innovative Responses to Regulation
Enforcement of the interest rate regulatory regime re-
quired the continued vigilance and discipline of banking regu-
lators, particularly since market interest rates began to rise
after the 1951 Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord. Time and
again, financial institutions tried to get around Regulation Q
and exploit legal cracks and loopholes by developing "financial
21 1993 ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 17, at 438 (Table B-76). Although real
interest rates were much higher in the 1980s than the 1940s, the federal budget
deficit was nearly five times larger and the gross federal debt nearly two and one-
half times larger (as a percentage of GDP) during the 1940s when compared with
the 1980s. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 17. From a broad historical
perspective, there is no compelling empirical evidence to support the conventional
wisdom that public deficit spending must necessarily cause higher interest and
inflation rates.
2 1993 ECONOMic REPORT, supra note 17, at 384 (Table B-31), 414 (Table B-
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innovations," i.e., money substitutes.' Such efforts directly
threatened the system of regulatory supervision and enforce-
ment and the public policy objectives underlying it. Every time
banks and non-bank institutions challenged the regulatory
scheme through such processes of "financial innovation," the
regulatory authorities and the Congress faced renewed pres-
sure either to ratify the innovation or bring the new financial
instrument under the domain of Regulation Q.
Financial deregulation became an evolutionary process
driven by rising nominal interest rates.24 Whenever market
rates of interest rose above regulated depository interest rate
ceilings for a sustained period of time, U.S. commercial banks
sought to introduce new financial instruments to compete with
the unregulated markets for depository funds. Each crack in
the interest rate regime made sustaining the intricate regu-
latory structure more difficult.
The U.S. legal regime permitted alternative markets, such
as markets for commercial paper and short-term Treasury
bonds, to exist and flourish.' Federal regulation applied only
to certain depository institutions. The Bank Holding Company
Act regulated "any institution organized under federal or state
law which accepted demand deposits and made commercial
loans."" Corporations avoided this definition, however, by
acquiring a bank and then taking the bank out of the commer-
cial loan business. The corporation thereby created what has
become known in legal parlance as the "nonbank bank." 7
Competition from these nonbank financial institutions and
unregulated offshore money markets led U.S. commercial
banks to advocate the repeal of Regulation Q interest rate
2' See generally MARTIN MAYER, NIGHTMARE ON WALL STREET: SALOMON
BROTHERS AND THE CORRUPTION OF THE MARKETPLACE (1993); MARTIN MAYER, THE
MONEY BAZAARS (1984).
' Robert A. Eisenbeis, Bank Holding Companies and Public Policy, in FINAN-
CIAL SERVICES, supra note 7, at 124, 133.
' In addition, the internationalization of the dollar contributed to the devel-
opment of the unregulated Eurodollar market, which competed with regulated com-
mercial bank deposit rates. The liquidity crunches of 1966 and 1969-70 revealed
that large depositors could evade the interest rate ceilings by turning to the Euro-
dollar market. Huertas, supra note 7, at 23-26.
U 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1988).
SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 6, at 360. One solution to this enforcement
challenge would be to return to a "chartering" rather than an "activities" definition
of a bank. Id. at 354-55.
1304 [Vol. 60: 1295
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ceilings. Banks, which had traditionally served as "intermedi-
aries" between depositors and borrowers, were closed out of
evolving sources of funds as market rates rose above the ceil-
ings mandated by Regulation QY Banks, reacting to the re-
sulting "disintermediation crisis" and liquidity squeeze in 1970,
attempted to exploit the holding company organizational form
"by issuing nonreservable commercial paper as a liability of the
holding company and downstreaming funds to subsidiary
banks."" In response, Regulation Q was amended to close this
loophole. Similarly, when bank holding companies began to
issue a series of floating rate notes in 1974, the Federal Re-
serve, pursuant to congressional authorization, gradually
brought the note issues under Regulation Q. 0
Federal regulators did not impede every attempt at finan-
cial innovation, however. For instance, in response to rising
interest rates and the resulting "disintermediation crisis" of
the late 1950s, the Federal Reserve granted approval of the
negotiable certificate of deposit ("CD"), allowing banks to at-
tract corporate funds away from the securities market on the
basis of price."' This open competition for corporate funds nec-
essarily resulted in greater upward pressure on interest rates.
Finally, in 1973, federal regulators removed the ceilings on
interest rates on commercial bank CDs of $100,000 or more."2
The demise of interest rate regulation, therefore, occurred
in stages. First, the Federal Reserve Board abandoned the
policy goal of pegging nominal interest rates below the Regula-
tion Q ceilings. This change provided the incentive for regula-
tory evasion. Large "sophisticated" institutional players then
pushed the concept of "financial innovation" ever farther. After
regulators ratified such evasions, it was only a matter of time
before the cracks developed into a more general breach, justi-
fied by spurious arguments of equity and fairness to small
' These alternative sources of finds included repurchase agreements, the Euro-
dollar market, the federal fund market, and the market for large certificates of
deposit ("CDs"). Eisenbeis, supra note 24, at 133.
Eisenbeis, supra note 24, at 133.
' Eisenbeis, supra note 24, at 135.
21 Huertas, supra note 7, at 23-26.
Statement of Henry Schechter, supra note 9. Nearly nine years after the
relaxation of Regulation Q on large CDs, Continental Illinois experienced a hemor-
rhage of such fuinds, bringing the bank to the edge of collapse. See infra notes
103-15 and accompanying text.
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savers.
B. Transnational Factors: Regulatory Arbitrage Between
Competing Jurisdictions
Since the mid-1950s, the pace of financial deregulation
was heavily influenced by transnational factors, particularly
the development of offshore markets, which were exempt from
U.S. taxation, securities laws, reserve requirements and other
regulations. In the early 1990s, the regulatory competition of
neighboring jurisdictions continued to pose myriad opportuni-
ties for private corporations to engage in a process of "regulato-
ry arbitrage," playing one sovereign jurisdiction off against
another to minimize regulatory costs. For instance, through
the increasingly popular innovation of offshore incorporation,
the Cayman Islands and other peripheral jurisdictions contin-
ued to exert inordinate authority over the legal factors affect-
ing market interest rates in the United States.3
This process, whereby one jurisdiction undermines the
legal regime of a neighboring jurisdiction, has been described
as a "race for the bottom." 4 For instance, Delaware has been
described as "a pygmy among the fifty states [that] prescribes,
interprets, and indeed denigrates national corporate policy as
an incentive to encourage incorporation within its borders."35
The result is a legal regime in which basic public policy objec-
tives are ignored in the process of chartering corporations. 6
' Krysten Jenci, Fed Gets Grilled on Oversight of Banks' Cayman Island Activ-
ity, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REGULATOR, June 28, 1993, at 2 (foreign offshore
branches are "'free of any U.S. reserve requirements, FDIC premiums or statisti-
cal reporting requirements'" (quoting a Federal Reserve statement); Robert N.
McCauley & Rama Seth, Foreign Bank Credit to U.S. Corporations: The Implica-
tions of Offshore Loans, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV., Spring 1992, at 52.
' William J. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974).
Id. at 701; see also THEODORE LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 175 (2d ed. 1979) ("A suburb is ultimately an
instrument [a legal fiction] by which the periphery can exploit the center, by
which a single unit of the whole can exploit the rest.").
" In place of this regulatory arbitrage between states, Congress could legislate
a level playing field with minimum legal requirements. Cary, supra note 34, at
705 ("A civilizing jurisprudence should import lifting standards."). A federal charter
for corporations could provide minimum standards for fiduciary duties, shareholder
voting rights on executive compensation, capital structures, and limits on a
corporation's debt/equity ratio. WILLIAM F. HIXSON, A MAITER OF INTEREST: REEX-
1306 [Vol. 60: 1295
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Over the past century, the same dynamic developed in bank-
ing; a "dual banking system" allowed private interests to shop
around for the jurisdiction with the most relaxed regulatory
environment. Although Congress periodically enacted legis-
lation to encourage state-chartered banks to recharter under
federal law, it refused directly to preempt state law. Since
"[s]tate bank regulations were often less stringent than Feder-
al regulation," there was no incentive for state-chartered banks
to recharter under federal law. State banking regulation
undermined the federal regime of regulated interest rates by
permitting some of the most significant financial innovations of
the 1970s.3"
Likewise, other "pygmy" jurisdictions, situated beyond the
reach of U.S. law, can have profound effects upon the U.S.
regulatory regime. E. Gerald Corrigan, former president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and head of the Bank for
International Settlement's Committee on Global Banking Su-
pervision, has noted that because money flows to those juris-
dictions that regulate the least, the result has been a regulato-
ry rush to the 'least common denominator."39 Offshore financ-
ing effectively raises the level of depository interest rates and
adds competitive pressures to the regulated environment of
U.S. banking and finance. U.S. banks find themselves at a
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis offshore banks and offshore
mutual funds, both in attracting deposits and booking loans."
Periphery jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, the
AMINING MONEY, DEBT, AND REAL ECONOMIc GROWTH 255 (1991); see also HENRY
C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 58-60 (1948).
31 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT: 1984, at 171 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 ECONOMIC REPORT].
'Id.
Steve Lohr, Where The Money Washes Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, § 6
(Magazine), at 26, 28-32. In Georgetown alone (the capital of the Cayman Islands),
nearly 600 banking outposts hold over $400 billion. Most of these banks are mere
shells or booking centers which traffic in computerized electronic debits and credits
to evade U.S. regulations and taxes. Id. at 27.
"' See supra note 33. United States banks also argued that they faced a com-
petitive disadvantage vis-a-vis securities firms because of unequal regulation. See
The Bottom Line, BANKER, June 1993, at 64 (listing proposals to harmonize mini-
mum capital standards for securities firms and banks to ensure a "level playing
field" and prevent banks from being priced out of business); Christi Harlan &
Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., SEC Considers Controls on Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Apr.
29, 1993, at C1 (SEC may extend capital requirements for securities firms to cover
exposure to forwards, swaps and other derivatives).
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Netherlands Antilles and more than four dozen other offshore
banking centers41 effectively have undermined the regulatory
regime of the core jurisdiction, the world's largest industrial
economy.
While money has begun to flow more freely between the
United States and periphery jurisdictions, particularly since
the 1970s, there has been a general failure to develop the insti-
tutional mechanisms necessary to harmonize the respective
regulatory environments, ensure a level playing field, and
minimize the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. In fact,
the regulatory authorities often encouraged this fragmented
policy. For instance, in 1981 the Federal Reserve Board autho-
rized the establishment of International Banking Facilities
("IBFs") by certain financial institutions within the United
States to act as bookkeeping entities to attract Eurodollar de-
posits. IBFs were exempt from various federal regulations,
including reserve and deposit insurance requirements, and
interest rate ceilings. A number of states, including New York,
California, Illinois and Florida, added to this regulatory race to
the bottom by exempting IBF profits from state and local taxa-
tion to encourage the establishment of IBFs within their bor-
ders.42
The development and financial integration of the Europe-
an Economic Community ("EEC") during the 1960s and 1970s,
which undertook to allow the freer flow of money and capital,
should have provided compelling evidence of the increasing
need for harmonization between disparate jurisdictions. Such
expanded trade and financial payments necessitated closer
cooperation in the laws of neighboring countries. Unfortunate-
ly, during a critical stage of global financial integration, the
vision and energy of American policymakers was diverted else-
where. The United States expended diplomatic capital on mat-
41 By some estimates, nearly half of the world's money now resides or passes
through offshore banking centers. Lohr, supra note 39, at 28; see also INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL LAW: LENDING, CAPITAL TRANSFERS AND INSTITUTIONS 53 (Robert
S. Rendell ed., 1980) (unregulated Eurodollar market in loans and bonds); id. at
197 (unregulated, offshore international mutual funds).
4 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 19, at 85 & n.3; Bowman Brown &
Emmanuel N. Roussakis, Offshore Banking Centers, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING 84
(Emmanuel N. Roussakis ed., 1983); Howard M. Wachtel, The Global Funny Money
Game, NATION, Dec. 26, 1987, at 784, 786.
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ters unrelated to harmonization on the core economic issues of
international banking and high finance."
III. DEREGULATION IN THE CARTER ERA
In the broad policy areas of banking and finance, the simi-
larities between the Carter and Reagan administrations far
outweigh the differences. Both presidents accepted basic free-
market premises that were often at odds with market realities.
The result was a bipartisan dismantling of the New Deal regu-
latory regime in banking and finance and a relaxation of the
regulatory discipline that had contained market interest rates
during the period after World War II.
A. The Inflation-Interest Rate Spiral
The late 1970s saw profound transformation of several
important conditions which had supported the regulatory re-
gime. Until the mid-1960s in particular, low and stable inter-
est rates and the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange
rates had enabled national governments to regulate interest
rate ceilings on existing money markets while impeding the
development of high interest-bearing financial instruments."
But as market interest rates rose above the level of U.S. inter-
est ceilings and cross-border financial flows expanded, large
depositors could increasingly shop around for the highest re-
' For instance, the United States and Cayman Islands had signed a narcotics
agreement and the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in the 1980s to provide for
cooperation and the sharing of information in drug, white collar crime and bank
fraud cases. The two countries, however, remained at an impasse over a tax-infor-
mation exchange agreement and other issues related to bank secrecy, and there
was virtually no attempt to harmonize more fundamental policies of bank regula-
tion such as reserve requirements and deposit insurance. Lohr, supra note 39, at
46, 52.
44 See MAXWELL WATSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOP-
MENTS AND PROSPECTS 40 (1988). In 1944, the World Bank and International Mon-
etary Fund ("IMF) were created at an international conference at Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire. Article VI of the IMFs Articles of Agreement gave member na-
tions the right to control capital movements, particularly short-term capital move-
ments which would not restrict trade. Cooling Down Hot Money, ECON. JUSTICE
REP., June 1994, at 4; see also Howard M. Wachtel, Taming Global Money, CHAL-
LENGE, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 36, 39 ("The Bretton Woods arrangements were con-
structed, in part, to allow nations to follow their own domestic economic policies
without having them distorted by foreign-exchange speculation.").
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turns. "IT]he more sophisticated of these depositors sought
higher returns in the open market from less regulated competi-
tors."45
Rather than curbing innovations, U.S. regulators ratified
them "by raising interest rate ceilings on close substitutes
offered by banks and thrifts."46 Moreover, the Democratic ad-
ministration and Congress opted not to extend the scope of
regulation to nonbank institutions and failed to harmonize
policy with peripheral jurisdictions. Interest rates were allowed
to rise at the expense of important national economic objectives
and the federal government bowed to the myriad pressures for
financial deregulation. Chief among these pressures were the
shifting economic landscape and a political environment domi-
nated by the fear of inflation.
Throughout the 1970s, inflation and interest rates became
higher and more variable. By the early 1980s, nominal and
real interest rates reached postwar peaks. In 1981, the nomi-
nal (market) prime interest rate reached 18.87%, and the real
prime rate topped 8%. The market rate on long-term govern-
ment bonds rose to 13.91% in 1981, and the real rate on such
bonds peaked at about 8.5% in 1984. Finally, inflation reached
13.5% in 1980.47 Depositors protested that the Regulation Q
interest rate ceilings constrained their returns even as infla-
tion eroded the value of their deposits. In addition, bankers
constantly reminded policy makers that escalating price infla-
tion had pushed market interest rates into double digit levels,
well above the ceilings imposed by Regulation Q and the vari-
ous state usury ceilings on loans. The great price inflation of
' WATSON ET AL., supra note 44, at 40; see also Eisenbeis, supra note 24, at
133.
' Eisenbeis, supra note 24, at 133; WATSON ET AL., supra note 44, at 42
("These ceilings [on interest rates] were progressively relaxed during the 1970s
and 1980s. Pressure to relax these interest ceilings increased as savers sought
higher market yields by purchasing government debt or money market funds. In
addition, with the lifting of exchange controls, large borrowers and lenders turned
to the Eurocurrency market to obtain additional funds and to earn a market re-
turn on their financial assets.").
47 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT: 1992, at 366, 378 (1992) (Tables B-60 & B-69) [hereinafter 1992 ECO-
NOMIC REPORT]; WATSON ET AL., supra note 44, at 40. What role did U.S. financial
institutions play in the corporate pricing decisions which fueled the 1970s infla-
tion? See generally DAVID M. KOTZ, BANK CONTROL OF LARGE CORPORATIONS IN
TUE UNITED STATES (1978).
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the 1970s eventually destroyed the support for low interest
rates and undermined the regulated regime.
According to the conventional wisdom of the late 1970s,
the U.S. price inflation was largely the result of demand-pull
forces, i.e., excess demand pulling up prices in tight markets.
According to the emerging monetarist dogma, inflation was
simply the result of "too much money chasing too few
goods."4 That explanation, however, largely ignored the low-
capacity utilization rates for capital and labor and failed to
consider that the real money supply was growing at a slower
rate than the real Gross National Product. 9
However flawed, Chicago school "monetarism" did provide
the theoretical justification for higher interest rates. Tight
money became the policy of choice. At a critical moment in
time, perception was more important than reality and the
policy makers shared a common enthusiasm for austerity to
wring the inflationary fevers out of the economy. President
Carter's 1979 appointment of Paul Volcker to head the Federal
Reserve Board confirmed this outlook. Under Volcker, the Fed
announced that it would ignore the rising level of interest
'3 MILTON FRIEDIAN & ANNA F. SCHWARTZ, MONETARY TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 19 (1982) ("Substantial changes in prices and
minimal income are almost invariably the result of changes in the nominal supply
of money."). For further discussion of monetarism, see JAMES K. GALBRAITH &
WILLAM DARITY, JR., MACROECONOMICS 215-38 (1994).
' The real money supply, as measured by deflated Ml, has grown more slowly
than the real GNP. See ALBERT T. SOMMERS, THE U.S. ECONOMY DEMYSTIFIED 117
(1985); LYNN TURGEON, STATE AND DISCRIMINATION: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COLD
WAR 17, 112-13 n.34 (1989).
MI represents the sum of currency, demand deposits, travelers checks and
other checkable deposits. M2 consists of Mi plus overnight repurchase agreements
and Eurodollars, money market mutual fund balances, money market deposit ac-
counts, and savings and small time deposits. M3 consists of M2 plus large time
deposits, term repurchase agreements, term Eurodollars, and institution-only mon-
ey market mutual funds. 1992 ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 47, at 373 (Table B-
65).
Money is the grease that lubricates the gears of the economy. If the growth
of the money supply does not keep up with GNP growth, sooner or later GNP
growth may decline. See Lacy Hunt, The Velocity Trap, STANDARD & POOR'S CRED-
IT WEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 1 (large decelerations in the broad monetary aggre-
gates have historically preceded poor business conditions); Henry B. Gonzalez,
Chair, House Banking Committee, N.Y. TIES, June 13, 1993, § 4, at 18 (Letter to
the Editor) (by 1993, for the first time since the end of World War I1, the basic
money supply defined as M2 was negative for an entire quarter and the real per
capita money supply was falling rapidly).
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rates. Instead it would try to control the entire supply of mon-
ey and credit in a $3.5 trillion economy by targeting the
growth of volatile monetary aggregates."
Unfortunately, tight money was a particularly inappropri-
ate method of dealing with cost-push inflationary forces such
as the rise of marginal costs in a slow market. Moderate in-
creases in interest rates were passed on to consumers in the
form of higher prices and the recessionary costs of tight money
led to even greater inflationary pressures.5' To effectively im-
pede price escalation, the Volcker policy therefore required the
brutal logic of more "credible" increases in interest rates. Ever
tighter money, ever higher nominal interest rates, and eventu-
ally higher real interest rates, wrung inflation out of the econ-
" In that way, the Federal Reserve was attempting to keep the volatile mone-
tary aggregates of M1 and M2 at doctrinaire levels. By July 1993, the Federal
Reserve had publicly decided to abandon its reliance on money supply growth as a
yardstick for its anti-inflation policy. This change in policy reflected the fact that
slower money supply growth had failed to achieve the overriding policy goal of
zero inflation. By targeting real interest rates instead of monetary growth (and by
calculating such rates according to the federal funds rate paid by the most credit-
worthy banks on overnight borrowings of reserves), Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan hoped to defuse criticism that the Federal Reserve was keeping
interest rates too high by limiting the growth of the money supply to levels below
the Federal Reserve's own monetary targets. See Steven Greenhouse, Fed Aban-
dons Policy Tied to Money Supply, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1993, at Dl; Steven
Greenhouse, Greenspan Is Upbeat on Growth, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1993, at D1.
Despite the fact that inflation persisted while monetary growth had stagnated,
the Federal Reserve still refused to admit the need for a more fundamental reori-
entation of policy away from tight money and high interest rates and towards a
greater focus on other non-monetary factors of inflation. See infra note 58 and
accompanying text.
"' While there has been widespread concern over the inflationary effects of
regulatory costs, Robert D. Hershey Jr., Inflation Stays Subdued, With Consumer
Prices Climbing 0.2%, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1995, at Dl ("one of the few remaining
symptoms of inflation was actually caused by the medicine the Federal Reserve
used to fight it"), far too little attention has been paid to the effects of financing
costs on the inflation rate. If the costs of regulation ultimately can be pushed on
to consumers in the form of higher prices (in itself, a "cost-push" critique of the
market), then other costs, such as financing costs, also can be passed along to
consumers. Id. at D8 (automobile finance charges rose 32.8% over the past year,
"a direct reflection of the Fed's efforts to slow the economy" and contain inflation
with rising interest rates; the rise in such finance charges represented a "sizable
chunk" of the reported increase in consumer price inflation). Increases in interest,
in excess of productivity increases, are necessarily inflationary. HIXSON, supra note
36, at 207-08. Furthermore, as Keynes himself recognized, the price level depends
partly on marginal cost, which will rise during periods of declining output and
declining capacity utilization rates. John M. Keynes, Relative Movements in Real
Wages and Output, ECON. J., Mar. 1939, at 44-45.
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omy, by destroying private industry and throwing millions of
citizens out of work, thereby adding to both public and private
sector deficits.52
Monetarism was not socially neutral in its workings.
Rather, it reflected a commitment to the rich. After all, those
who lend are more affluent than those who borrow. High inter-
est rates single out the most vulnerable segments of the popu-
lation, while individuals and corporations with good assets are
rewarded in the form of increased interest income. Tight mon-
ey and the high real rate of interest are the most important
and least recognized factors fueling a massive redistribution of
wealth and income away from working Americans, indebted
farmers and small businesses and toward wealthy individuals,
creditors, and large corporations."
The advent of monetarism represented, if not the intellec-
tual bankruptcy of alternative methods of fighting inflation, at
least a paralysis of the political will required to adopt "income
policies." Gone were the days when a Democratic President
could "jawbone" big business and big labor to keep the consum-
er price index stable and wage increases in line with produc-
tivity growth.54 The opportunism and ultimate failure of Rich-
Tight money, without complementary incomes and fiscal policies, led to an
overvalued dollar and artificially high real interest rates. See generally ROBERT
LEKACHMAN, GREED Is NOT ENOUGH: REAGANOMICS 128-35 (1982); JOHN WILLIAM-
SON, THE EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM (2d ed. 1985).
' See GREIDER, supra note 11, at 170, 456-57 (deregulation resulted in several
hundred billion dollars of increased interest payments from debtors to creditors);
KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN AFTERMATH 95 (1990) (wealthy individuals and corpo-
rations were the greatest beneficiaries of the high real interest rates); id. at 165,
241 (Appendix B) (the share of wealth held by the wealthiest 0.5% of Americans
rose sharply, from about 14% in 1976 te more than 26% by 1983); Sylvia Nasar,
The 1980s: A Very Good Time for the Very Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1992, at Al,
D24 (Congressional Budget Office data showing that the average pre-tax income of
the top one percent grew by 77% during the 1980s in large part a result of high
interest returns on existing wealth); John Kenneth Galbraith, The State of the
World: Can We Hear The Voice of the Poor?, Address at The Burro Club (May 4,
1983).
For example, President Kennedy forced a price roll-back by steel companies
by threatening cancellation of Pentagon steel contracts as well as federal antitrust
prosecution. His efforts provided vital credibility for the government's commitment
to ensuring price and wage restraint and discipline. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 634-40 (1965).
U.S. steel companies now coordinate their price increases despite stable costs and
excess capacity. See Prices Raised by USX and Bethlehem, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
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ard Nixon's wage and price controls served to undermine the
legitimacy of any active government policy encouraging disci-
pline in protected, non-competitive and oligopolistic markets.
The nation's proud democratic heritage of government oppo-
sition to marketplace collusion and the anti-competitive pricing
practices of trusts, cartels and conglomerates was replaced by
a neoliberal accommodation of corporate power. The U.S. gov-
ernment no longer was involved as silent partner, as arbiter
between labor and management in the crucial processes of
wage bargaining and price determination.
In place of civilized, negotiated restraint, wages and prices
would have to be bludgeoned into stability by the effects of
tight money, high interest rates, and idle industrial and hu-
man capacity. By the end of 1980, tight money had proven
largely fatal to the Carter Administration. More importantly,
the monetary experiment had made financial deregulation
inevitable. Double digit interest rates imperiled the entire
structure of regulated interest rates.
B. Unraveling the Regime: The Legislative Assault
Throughout 1979 and 1980, U.S. securities dealers took
advantage of the environment of high market interest rates
and invaded the markets for deposits by introducing the money
market mutual fund. The mutual fund became the most impor-
tant financial innovation and money substitute by offering
many of the deposit services of banks without imposing the
costs of reserve requirements and federal deposit insurance.5
Depository institutions, unable to offer market interest rates to
depositors, found themselves at a competitive disadvantage.
Mutual funds quickly attracted billions of dollars in deposits
1993, § 1, at 41. Such price increases, while inflationary, are made possible by
pfotectionist measures against competing foreign steel. See Steven Greenhouse,
Punitive Tariffs Raised Against Foreign Steel, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1993, at D1.
But see Keith Bradsher, U.S. Overturns Tariffs on Many Steel Imports, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1993, at D1 (discussing effect of International Trade Commission's
elimination of steel importation tariffs).
' See Mlichael Mussa, Competition, Efficiency, and Fairness in the Financial
Services Industry, in DEREGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES: PUBLIC POLICY IN FLUX
121, 142-43 (George G. Kaufman & Roger C. Kormendi eds., 1986) [hereinafter
DEREGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES].
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away from banks and thrifts.56 As market interest rates rose
quickly into double digits, deposits in money market mutual
funds grew in tandem, from $5 billion in early 1978 to over
$40 billion by the end of 1979.' 7 Congress held hearings on
the matter but ultimately refused to bring the money market
mutual fund under the authority of Regulation Q."5
Fueled by the rising market rates of interest, the money
market mutual fund became the lightning rod for political
opponents to Regulation Q. In late 1979, the President's Inter-
Agency Task Force on Regulation Q reported its recommenda-
tion that the depository interest rate ceilings be removed.59
Within months, President Carter had signed into law the De-
pository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980 ("DIDMCA"). 6° This Act ratified the liberalization of de-
pository interest rate ceilings, preempted state usury ceilings
on mortgage loans, and allowed depository institutions to offer
negotiable order of withdrawal ("NOW") accounts.6
See Huertas, supra note 7, at 25-26.
7 Money Market Mutual Funds: Hearings on Oversight on the Supervision and
Regulation of Money Market Mutual Funds and the Effects of the Funds in Finan-
cial Markets before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 493 (1980) [hereinafter
Hearings on Money Market Mutual Funds].
Id. at 394-95 (arguing that reserve requirements should not be extended to
money market mutual funds ("M M.Fs")); id. at 497-98 (viewing MMMFs as the
evolving means to circumvent existing depository interest rate restrictions). Banks
found themselves at a further competitive disadvantage since MMNlFs were not re-
quired to follow the Community Reinvestment Act, which requires banks to lend
in poor communities. See Steven Greenhouse, Nonbanks' Community Role Will Be
Target of U.S. Study, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1993, at D1.
;' PRESIDENT'S INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON REGULATION Q, THE REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON REGULATION Q (1979). The task
force consisted of members from the Departments of the Treasury and Housing
and Urban Development, the Office of Management and Budget, the Council of
Economic Advisors, the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Con-
sumer Affairs, and the White House Domestic Policy Staff. Participating regulatory
agencies included the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the National Credit Union Administration,
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
' Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C. (1988)).
" See id. Essentially an interest-bearing checking account, the NOW account
remained subject to interest rate ceilings for several years while the newly created
Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee was charged with phasing out
these and other existing limitations on depository interest rates. Paul M. Iorvitz,
Payments System Developments and Public Policy, in FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra
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Prior to passage of DIDMCA, Congress had failed to pre-
empt state-chartered banks from undermining the federal
regime.6 2 The NOW account was a primary example of an in-
novation first permitted by state banking regulators. 3 Con-
gress decided to preempt state law only in one area of
DIDMCA, since its purpose was not to set a more exacting
federal standard.64 Rather, Congress determined that in the
area of mortgage usury there would be no effective standard:
the race to the bottom would be dictated by neither federal law
nor the laws of state jurisdictions, but by the vagaries of the
marketplace.65 The "law of the jungle" would uphold any in-
terest rate agreed upon between borrower and lender, regard-
less of wide disparities in bargaining power between the par-
ties.
DIDMCA was a stunning victory for private U.S. banking
interests, highlighting the deficiencies that can develop in the
dual banking system when Congress refuses to legislate a
minimum regulatory standard. The complete capitulation of
the Democrats, both in Congress and in the White House,
made the end of the New Deal framework in money and bank-
ing inevitable.66
note 7, at 64, 76; SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 6, at 45-46. The authority of
individual regulatory agencies to set ceiling rates was transferred to the Deposito-
ry Institutions Deregulation Committee, comprising the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and the heads of
other agencies that regulate depository institutions. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
supra note 19, at 71; George G. Kaufman et al., The Future of Commercial Banks
in the Financial Services Industry, in FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 7, at 94,
103.
See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
1984 ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 171.
See generally To Authorize a National Usury Ceiling: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). There was token consideration of
proposals for a federal usury ceiling but the idea was easily rejected.
I3 d.
" At least two members of President Carter's Inter-Agency Task Force on
Regulation Q, Roger C. Altman, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Domestic Fi-
nance, and Donna Shalala, Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
for Policy and Research, were top appointees in the Clinton administration.
As Deputy Treasury Secretary, Altman espoused austerity (confusing the
cause-and-effect relationship of federal deficits and high interest rates) and lobbied
for the Clinton Administration's head-in-the-sand proposal to ease the credit
crunch by relaxing bank rules related to documentation, collateral requirements,
appraisal standards and examinations. For a description of the regulations, see
[Vol. 60: 1295
TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. BANKING AND FINANCE
IV. THE REAGAN ERA
It is all too easy to view the presidency of Ronald Reagan
in near mythical terms. To this day, few people are neutral
about its legacy. To separate the reputation from reality, fic-
tion from fact, may demand an uncomfortable measure of self-
scrutiny for critics and supporters alike. Conservative admir-
ers, for instance, remain convinced that Ronald Reagan ush-
ered in a free-market revolution which dramatically changed
the nation's course from the failed policies of the Carter Ad-
ministration. The Reagan Revolution, according to this myth,
was compromised and betrayed, at first by an inner White
House staff, later by Bush Republicans, and always by the
Democrats.
In contrast, liberal detractors offer a counter-myth, charac-
terizing the Reagan Presidency as a period of reaction which
ushered in a politics of greed, an apocalypse of self-interest.
Under this view, the Democratic Congress, while first humbled
by the great teflon communicator and offering only weak resis-
tance, eventually rallied to prevent Reaganomics from wreak-
ing even greater havoc on American society. When the fog had
lifted, it was apparent that the Grand Old Party had left the
nation with a multi-trillion dollar hangover, effectively tying
the hands of future presidents for many years to come.
These two myths-Reagan as revolutionary and Reagan as
reactionary-satisfy the conscience. Like most myths, they
allow the faithful to sleep a bit better at night, secure in the
comfort of their own virtue. But such satisfactions are illusory.
A more sober examination of the Reagan Presidency reveals
other disquieting truths. Nowhere is the dissonance between
myth and reality more troubling than in the strategic heights
of banking and finance. Monetary policy became firmly en-
John H. Cushman Jr., Clinton Plan Would Soften Banking Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1993, at DI. Appropriately, Altman also was appointed by President
Clinton as acting chief of the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC"), the
government's multi-billion dollar bailout agency for collapsing financial institutions.
Ironically, as Secretary of Health and Human Services, Shalala bemoaned the
high interest rates on loans for medical students. Yet according to Shalala, the
politics of selfishness and self-interestedness, along with a deregulated economy,
were unfortunate "facts of life." Larry King Live: Interview with Donna Shalala
(CNN television broadcast, Apr. 7, 1993).
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trenched during the Reagan years as the nation's most impor-
tant policy lever and, as a result, quietly affected the prosperi-
ty and well-being of the American people, the fortunes of the
U.S. economy, and the distribution of national income.
In reality, Ronald Reagan's policies in banking and finance
did not represent any dramatic change in direction, whether
for good or ill, from those of his predecessor. The Reagan pro-
gram was a change only in pace and degree, the culmination of
a long bipartisan slide into complacency and mediocrity, a self-
indulgent rejection of the populist and egalitarian tradition
that had animated debate over banking and finance policy at
crucial moments throughout the nation's history.67
As Ronald Reagan took office, the table already had been
set for a decisive assault on the New Deal regulatory frame-
work in banking and finance. The genie of financial specula-
tion may not yet have escaped from its bottle, but a Democrat-
ic administration had, at the very least, moved in that direc-
tion in response to the same free-market frenzy that had
helped propel Ronald Reagan to power. During Reagan's presi-
dency, however, financial speculation was not just encouraged,
it was glorified. The cork was twisted off, the smoke appeared,
and the genie of speculation was finally out in the open, huge
The American populist and egalitarian tradition finds its roots in the Consti-
tution, which provides the Congress with the exclusive power to coin and regulate
money. U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. Thomas Jefferson's opposition to the First
National Bank and Andrew Jackson's historic veto of the re-charter of the Second
National Bank-arguably the most important presidential veto in U.S. histo-
ry-were watershed points.
While the Second National Bank was vested with public powers, its charter
provided that 80% of the stock ownership and directors were to be private. The
present-day Federal Reserve System has similar characteristics, exercising public
functions while largely under private control and direction. Such quasi-governmen-
tal institutions were once considered unconstitutional, violating the very first sen-
tence of Article I, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution ("All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . ."). For example,
in 1935 the Supreme Court found that the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933 had unlawfully delegated legislative power to private trade associations. Ac-
cording to Justice Cardozo, it was "delegation running riot." Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935). Unfortunately, in overturning
Schechter Poultry, the Supreme Court threw out the healthy baby (the nondelega-
tion doctrine) with the dirty bathwater (the flawed, narrow interpretation of the
Commerce Clause). Overly broad delegations of legislative power to semi-autono-
mous bureaucracies may be the most unfortunate legacy of the New Deal's techno-
cratic impulse. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDi-
CIAL REVIEW 132 (1980).
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and powerful, dominating industry and enterprise.
A. Salesman of a Rentier Culture"
The Reagan administration had its first great legislative
success, a huge supply-side tax cut, in 1981. This policy, which
disproportionately rewarded the highest income tax brackets,
was soon overshadowed by deepening recession. Volcker's tight
money policy continued to wring price inflation out of the econ-
omy at the cost of enormous idle capacity. Before the end of
1982, unemployment reached double digits and contributed to
the Republicans' large losses in the congressional elections. An
expansionary fiscal program consisting in large part of increas-
es in military expenditures, however, began to revive the econ-
omy. 69
Throughout Ronald Reagan's first term in office, market
interest rates and the inflation rate exceeded the Regulation Q
depository rate ceilings. By 1982, with a prime lending rate of
over 15%, yields on government securities in the double digits,
and inflation at around 6%,7 regulators remained under the
"' From his first days in office, Ronald Reagan styled his presidency after the
laissez-faire administration of Calvin Coolidge. He chose as his first Secretary of
the Treasury, Donald Regan, the top gun at Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, a Wall Street giant that had led the way in financial innovations. (Merrill
Lynch had developed innovative financial instruments such as its Cash Manage-
ment Account, essentially a mutual fund that offered market returns along with
full transactional payments capabilities not unlike a demand deposit.) See Horvitz,
supra note 61, at 90; SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 6, at 434. Donald Regan's
parallel figure in the Coolidge administration, Treasury Secretary Andrew W. Mel-
lon, lauded by Wall Street as "the greatest Secretary of the Treasury since Alex-
ander Hamilton," also had played a leading role in the financial speculation of the
1920s. NATHAN MILLER, FDR: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 237 (1983).
" Many comparisons have been made between the Kennedy and Reagan ad-
ministrations. Both presidents were military Keynesians who primed the fiscal
pump by cutting tax rates and raising the level of defense spending. ROBERT L.
BARTLEY, THE SEVEN FAT YEARS AND How TO Do IT AGAIN (1992); PAUL C. ROB-
ERTS, THE SUPPLY SIDE REVOLUTION 76-81 (1984); LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD
KEYNESIANISM: THE EVALUATION OF ECONOMIC THINING IN POLICYMAKING SINCE
WORLD WAR I1 (forthcoming). The Kennedy administration, however, was able to
achieve a cheap money, low interest rate environment by relying on a broad social
consensus to control inflation. The Reagan administration, on the other hand,
relied on high interest rates and social fragmentation to keep inflation in check.
71 1984 ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 283, 299. Note that while these
figures show a real rate of interest of nine percent for the most credit-worthy cor-
porate borrowers and more than four percent for the federal government itself,
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same pressures that had existed late in the Carter Administra-
tion: abolish the depository interest rate ceilings or extend
Regulation Q to encompass mutual funds and other prolifer-
ating money substitutes.7 The administration and the Con-
gress chose the former.
With the passage of the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982,72 interest rate deregulation became
complete. The Act allowed depository institutions to open mon-
ey market deposit accounts ("MMDA")! ' and set a timetable
under which all depository interest rate limits would expire in
1986. The Garn-St. Germain Act put the country on an irre-
versible course. It was the first time since 1933 that U.S.
banks were completely free from price restrictions, and thus
able to compete openly for deposits with commercial banks,
savings and loans, and nonbank financial institutions."
While the Garn-St. Germain Act expanded the turf of
commercial banks and thrifts, Wall Street was secure in the
knowledge that the Federal Reserve Board remained in the
hands of the "financial bankers" (as opposed to the "industrial
capitalists"). In early 1983, Paul Volcker was reappointed for
another term as Fed Chairman and approved by the Senate
such borrowers were effectively locked in to much higher real rates as inflation
declined during the life of longer-term loans. See SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD
SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 386 (1991) ("One event in the long-term
market stands out: at the peak of yields in the fall of 1981, the U.S. government
borrowed money for twenty years by issuing 15 3/4% bonds, which sold at just
under par to yield 15.78%. This stands as the highest bond yield the government
had to pay in the two-century history of the republic.").
" Robert A. Eisenbeis, Risk as a Criterion for Expanding Banking Activities, in
DEREGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 55, at 169, 173. While not liabili-
ties of commercial banks, these money substitutes were certainly an important
part of the medium of financial payments, thereby implicating significant public
policy considerations that would require their regulation. See Hearings on Money
Market Mutual Funds, supra note 57, at 475 (money market funds "include fea-
tures of a deposit system which belong exclusively to the banking business").
2 Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (1988)).
7 THE WORLD ECONOMY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS IN 1995: JAPAN'S ROLE AND
CHALLENGES 19-20 (1986) [hereinafter WORLD ECONOMY]; see also Michael Quint,
The Down Side of High Interest: Fallout of Decontrol Is Still Being Felt, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 1992, at L37-38 (describing negative effects of interest rate deregu-
lation); Leslie Wayne, Concern Over Bank Sales of Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1992, at D1 (questioning wisdom of banks' sale of mutual funds in response to low
interest rates).
14 See SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 6, at 45-46; Huertas, supra note 7, at 26.
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with strong bipartisan support."
The capture of the Federal Reserve Board foreshadowed a
global trend throughout the 1980s in which central banks led
the drive for financial deregulation across national borders.76
Liberalization was justified by free-market principles and
technocractic policy prescriptions rather than the mere self-
interest of the lending classes. The Mexican debt crisis of 1982,
and the dangers it posed to U.S. banks, presented an opportu-
nity for the Fed to expand its influence in the international
arena. To regain access to international credit markets, the
Mexican leadership was required to adopt a severe austerity
program and privatization measures, the preferred solutions of
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF").77
In 1982, Congress appropriated $8.5 billion to help support
the IMF. This allocation was only the first of many Reagan-era
public handouts to support the financial system. By 1984,
nearly two dozen countries, mostly Latin American, were
forced to reschedule their debt, borrowing from the IMF to pay
just the interest on their foreign loans. When Anthony
Soloman of the New York Federal Reserve Bank suggested a
"ecap" on interest rates to all such Third World debtors, the
proposal was quickly rejected by the commercial banking com-
munity and the Federal Reserve."
The U.S. economic expansion picked up steam following
the 1982 recession without any significant resurgence of price
inflation. The strong dollar, no doubt, contributed to this situa-
Seg GREIDER, supra note 11, at 570-74.
The U.S. Treasury Department also fully supports the program of financial
liberalization by regularly pressuring other nations to free their domestic interest
rates and divorce central bank policy from democratic and parliamentary political
control. For instance, in 1990, Treasury Undersecretary David C. Mulford increased
U.S. pressure on Japan's Ministry of Finance to deregulate depository interest
rates since the "very low levels of interest Japanese banks [paid] depositors [gave]
the institutions a vast source of cheap funding that enable[ld] them to lend at
interest rates well below those that U.S. and other international banks [could]
afford." William Krehm, Thickening Nightmare, ECON. REFORIM, Aug. 1993, at 7
(quoting a Wall Street Journal report); see also Treasury Official Urges Korea to
Reform Its Financial Sector, 60 BANKING REP. (BNA) 938, 938-39 (June 21, 1993)
(Treasury Undersecretary Lawrence Summers urging South Korea to decontrol
domestic interest rates and make other major changes to its financial system).
7 GREIDER, supra note 11, 485-86.
, Timothy A. Canova, Banking on the Brink: The Fall of Continental Illinois Is
Just the Beginning, CITY PAPER, Sept. 14-20, 1984, at 1, 9.
19951 1321
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
tion. Another important consideration, largely ignored by mon-
etary economists, was the administration's systematic assault
on organized labor and the collective bargaining system.79
This attack left U.S. workers in retreat and contributed to the
steep fall in real wages throughout the decade." Neverthe-
less, by the end of Ronald Reagan's first administration, most
Americans were convinced by his claim that they were "better
off than four years earlier" despite widespread industrial dis-
location, economic insecurity and lower real wages. After all,
voters were told, inflation and money interest rates were down
from their double digit levels.
The truth was a bit more worrisome. Inflation, in fact, was
in the low single digits. But the real rate of interest-the nom-
inal market rate minus the inflation rate-remained at re-
markably high levels. In 1983, inflation was down to 3.2%
while the yields on three-month Treasury bills hovered around
9%, the prime lending rate was at 11%, and interest rates on
new home mortgages reached over 12.5%. The real rate of
interest, therefore, ranged from nearly 6% for low-risk wealth
holders to 8% for prime corporate borrowers, but remained in
the double digits for consumer and mortgage borrowers.82
Throughout the rest of the decade, the real rate of interest
remained at its highest sustained level of the century-many
times higher than the 0.8% average real interest rate which
had prevailed for the previous forty year period. 3
" See generally Richard Edwards & Mlutaez Podgursky, The Unraveling Ac-
cord: American Unions in Crisis, in UNIONS IN CRISIS AND BEYOND (Richard Ed-
wards et al. eds., 1986); Sumner M. Rosen, Labor: A Movement at Risk?, in WHAT
REAGAN Is DOING To Us (Alan Gartner et al. eds., 1982); Timothy A. Canova,
Monologue or Dialogue in Management Decisions: A Comparison of Mandatory
Bargaining Duties in the United States and Sweden, 12 U. PENN. COMP. LAB. L.J.
257-64 (1991) (discussing the changes in labor policy from Roosevelt to Reagan);
Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Right to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
' PHILLIPS, supra note 53, at 98.
81 1984 ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 283, 299.
'2 See 1984 EcONOMIC REPORT, supra note 37, at 299.
' See Leonard Silk, The Crucial Issue Politicians Ignore, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
1992, at D2. During the period 1951-80, the real interest rate averaged 0.8%. But
for the decade of the 1980s, the real rate of interest averaged 4.7%. Id.
Over the past 130 years the real interest rate averaged about 3%. From 1940
to 1979 the real rate of interest on Moody's Aaa corporate bond yields averaged
about 1.5%. During the 1940s and 1950s, the rate was often negative. This real
interest rate averaged more than 4.5% throughout the 1980s, and about 4% today.
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In such a high interest rate environment, Americans were
attracted to the mutual fund. Money market mutual funds
grew tremendously throughout the 1980s; from $45 billion in
1979, to $207 billion by 1982, $1 trillion by the end of the
decade, and $1.6 trillion by 1993.4 Mutual funds invested
heavily in low-risk bonds, in government securities, and in-
creasingly in commercial paper.' Mutual funds pooled money
from thousands of individual investors and reduced risk by
spreading such investments over a more diversified portfolio of
stocks and bonds. Yet such funds remained vulnerable to a
more general downturn in the securities markets since they
were not federally insured and not subject to reserve require-
ments. Despite these risks, by mid-1992, mutual funds sup-
planted pension funds as the largest buyer of corporate equi-
ties, reportedly holding nearly $1 trillion in equities." During
See HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 70, at 430.
Even the figures by Homer and Sylla understate the severity of the present
high interest rate environment by relying on the Aaa corporate bond yield as a
benchmark. After all, those corporations with Aaa credit ratings actually profit
from a tight money/high interest rate environment as their existing assets are
rewarded in the form of increased interest income. See Galbraith, supra note 53.
Real interest rates have been significantly higher, for less credit-worthy customers,
such as consumers and most businesses, remaining in double digits. See Green-
house, supra note 54, at D2 (quoting economist who suggested that the real inter-
est rate on installment credit was 15%).
" See GREIDER, supra note 11, at 134; Carole Gould, The Economy's $1.6 Tril-
lion Gorilla, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1993, § 3, at 16; Jeffrey M. Laderman &
Geoffrey Smith, The Power of Mutual Funds, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 18, 1993, at 62
(discussing rapid growth of mutual funds); see also Paul Starobin, Make 'Em Pay,
NAVL J., July 24, 1993, at 1856 (number of U.S. households investing in mutual
funds increased from 6% in 1980 to 27% in 1993).
Note that the tremendous growth in money market mutual funds "damaged
the relationship between money supply growth and economic growth' because the
Federal Reserve's main measure of the money supply (M2) did not include institu-
tional holdings in money market mutual funds. See Greenhouse, supra note 54, at
D2.
See Gould, supra note 84, at 16.
See ROGER A. ARNOLD, MACROECONOMICS 264 (2d ed. 1992); Gould, supra
note 84, at 16; see also Susan Antilla, In the Face of a Fund Panic . . . , N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 1993, § 3, at 13 (discussing options to cash out of mutual funds
should their market collapse); Mussa, supra note 55, at 142.
Ironically, by the summer of 1993, the inevitable declines in interest rates (a
reflection of the weakening real economy) fueled record investment in the stock
market, largely through the vehicle of mutual fimds. See Robert Hurtado, Dow
Hits New High At 3,638.96: Interest Rates' Fall Spurs Broad Gains, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1993, at D1; Laura Jereski, Risks in Junk Bonds Rise as Mutual Funds
Play a Growing Role, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1993, at Al; Leslie Wayne, Investment
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the 1980s, the relatively wealthy planned for their individual
retirements by lending their savings to the money market bro-
kers at high interest rates with little concern that those same
funds were often channeled into high-interest lending and
speculative investments including the high-risk junk bonds
used to finance leveraged buyouts which in turn fueled the
stock market's rise. 7
The Reagan years marked a period in which the United
States moved significantly into a post-industrial rentier soci-
ety. The national work ethic was transformed into an atomized
competition for personal advantage. The neoliberal rentier
culture had found its voice in Ronald Reagan, the premier
cheerleader for the new public ethic, as he urged Americans to
indulge in private material gratification. This atomized and
hedonistic focus replaced the inter-generational ethic that had
bridged differences between races and economic classes
throughout the New Deal regulatory era.
Americans now sought to increase their wealth and status
primarily through increases in "rentier income"--income de-
rived in the form of interest from the ownership of money.
Monetarism's high real interest rates served as the reward, not
of effort or risk, but of wealth itself. Millions of people con-
vinced themselves that they could grow rich in their sleep as a
result of high interest rates." A "nihilism of the overfed" took
over as those with great wealth did in fact grow significantly
richer, earning many times the average U.S. income merely as
interest on their holdings. Those dependent on high interest
credit did not share in the windfall.
This system was not socially neutral. It resembled a mod-
ern social Darwinist universe in which the strongest were
rewarded for simply parting with their wealth, often at little or
no risk. The weaker members of society-the borrowers-were
locked in a stiff economic struggle for jobs, resources, and ex-
Soars in Mutual Funds, Causing Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1993, at Al.
See Jereski, supra note 86, at Al.
The United States quickly became a nation of usurers. Those who profited
from the high interest rates encouraged even their debtors to accept rentier val-
ues. Television advertising fostered a democratic illusion by encouraging the im-
pression that the high interest rate yields would provide the American Express
Dream to everyone, regardless of the fact that for millions of citizens personal
debt exceeded personal savings. See GREIDER, supr'a note 11, at 36.
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pensive credit. Those with wealth and savings took advantage
of the opportunity to profit from the high returns. Those de-
pendent on credit found themselves paying the highest sus-
tained real interest rates of the century. As the cost of capital
and credit rose, risk-taking and entrepreneurialism suffered.
The American dream of home ownership, of business owner-
ship, of directing and managing a productive enterprise, and of
creating new wealth was becoming more difficult to fulfill. In
its place, the drive to maximize one's interest, dividend and
capital gains in the financial sector by the "functionless" hold-
ing of titles to already existing wealth continued to develop.
The propaganda attack on Regulation Q effectively con-
vinced Americans that "small savers," those concentrated in
the low- and middle-income brackets, would benefit most by
the lifting of depository interest rate ceilings. 9 In reality, it
was the small saver who was hurt the most by the deregula-
tion of interest rates; small savers were the first to suffer the
higher finance charges, bank fees, escalating interest rates on
consumer and mortgage loans, higher prices, and greater job-
lessness." The new public ethic nonetheless appealed to the
most cynical nature of human beings by affirming that it was
acceptable to look no further than one's own nose in a single-
minded pursuit of wealth. This ethic signaled a transformation
in the national consciousness. Americans increasingly abdi-
cated responsibility and became unwilling to relinquish a sin-
gle basis point of private gain, unwilling to incur any sacrifice
in favor of the interests of the larger community and the wel-
fare of those younger, weaker and more vulnerable-those
whose future was limited by the advent of expensive credit.9'
Other industrial countries followed the U.S. lead by re-
moving controls on domestic interest rates, credit and capital
flows. Throughout the 1980s, financial innovations and off-
See GREIDER, supra note 11, at 166.
" Statement of Henry Schechter, supra note 9, at 135-36.
, Altruistic instincts were crushed easily in the emerging dog-eat-dog financial
environment. People no longer had time to look after their neighbors. Time was
limited, time was money, and if you didn't look after yourself, no one else would.
Extreme self-interest, the free-market apostles assured us, was the natural and
proper condition of humankind. But the underside of this confident vision of post-
modern American society revealed a fragmented and insecure existence, a patho-
logical devotion to the cult of the self.
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shore markets were permitted to flourish, as money markets
expanded at the expense of domestic interest rate discipline.92
At a time when the liberalization of capital flows between
divergent jurisdictions increased the need to coordinate regula-
tory activities, each nation instead moved to deregulate its own
domestic credit market and currency, once again introducing a
"race to the bottom."
President Reagan's eight years in office witnessed a tre-
mendous increase in activity in the international financial
markets.93 The future was marked by greater uncertainty,
risk, and financial speculation, reflected not just in higher
rates of interest, but in the kind of ruthless competitive reval-
uations and wide depreciations not seen since the beggar-thy-
neighbor days of the Great Depression. In addition, elected
officials could pursue expansionary fiscal policies only at the
risk of endangering their country's foreign currency value. The
1992 crisis in the European Monetary System would finally
demonstrate the awesome power of private international spec-
ulation to override the policies of virtually any central bank in
the world and the interests of so-called sovereign nations and
their democratically elected governments.94
92 WATSON ET AL., supra note 44, at 35-39. The "offshore market" should be
viewed as an attack on the very legitimacy and sovereignty of the democratic
nation-state, the moral equivalent of a black market.
' WATSON ET AL., supra note 44, at 35; BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,
61ST ANNUAL REPORT 119-20 (1991); see also HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 70, at 1
("The spectacular rise in interest rates during the 1970s and early 1980s pushed
many long-term market rates on prime credits up to levels never before ap-
proached, much less reached in modern history. A long view, provided by this
history, shows that recent peak yields were far above the highest prime long-term
rates reported in the United States since 1800, in England since 1700, or in Hol-
land since 1600. In other words, since modern capital markets came into existence,
there have never been such high long-term rates as we recently have had all over
the world." (emphasis added)).
94 See DUDLEY D. DILLARD, THE ECONOMICS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE
THEORY OF A MONETARY ECONOMY 228 (1948); see also KEYNES, supra note 10, at
159 ("Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise.
But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of
speculation."); WATSON ET AL., supra note 44, at 40; Roger Cohen, Europe's Cur-
rency Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1993, at 1 (describing the problems facing the
French economy and its effect on France's relationship with Germany due to the
probable collaspe of the franc); Louis Uchitelle, Dollar Sinks Against Yen Despite
Fed's Moves, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1993, at D1.
According to billionaire investor and currency speculator George Soros, the
European currency crisis was "very reminiscent of what happened during the
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B. Financial Bailout
The Great Depression revealed the dangers of supplanting
real industry and enterprise with a "casino economy" 95 in
which high real interest rates impose an intolerable and un-
sustainable debt burden on private income. All too often during
the financial bubble of the'late 1920s, interest did not reward
real industry, but was obtained by the owners of capital simply
by virtue of the scarcity of capital,96 a scarcity which was arti-
ficially imposed by the central monetary authority. The New
Deal regulatory framework originally was designed to discour-
age this overspeculation and to ensure a stable allocation of
capital into residential housing. Such regulation, however,
ultimately became a target of Reagan administration reform-
ers. For example, the 1982 Garn-St. Germain Act allowed
savings and loan associations to take demand deposits and
make commercial and industrial loans,97 removed numerous
other lending restrictions on federally chartered depository
institutions,9" and raised the level of federal deposit insurance
from $40,000 to $100,000 per account.99
As the financial sector became more competitive during
the early 1980s, it also became fraught with greater risks.
Americans scarcely seemed to notice, however. Leaders of both
major political parties failed to mention the dangers, and most
Americans were far too preoccupied with the pursuit of their
own private interests to notice.' 0 By 1984, cracks suddenly
appeared in the U.S. financial system.
Just as opponents of deregulation had warned, by the
early 1980s, rising depository interest rates spurred high-risk
interwar period, between World War I and World War II, and it's really amazing
how people haven't learned from past experience. It's as if Keynes had never lived.
Some of the same mistakes: overvalued currencies, sticking to monetary discipline
in a time of recession, you know, very high real interest rates. It's a tragic situa-
tion." Gary Weiss et al., The Man Who Moves Markets, BUS. WK., Aug. 23, 1993,
at 50, 53 (excerpts from interview of George Soros).
'5 HMSON, supra note 36, at 213.
M IIIXSON, supra note 36, at 231 (quoting John Maynard Keynes).
97 WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 73, at 19-20.
" SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 6, at 204 (the statutory restrictions that were
lifted included regulations dealing with loan-to-value ratios, amortization, aggregate
limits and maturity).
" Statement of Henry Schechter, supra note 9, at 132.
'0' Statement of Henry Schechter, supra note 9, at 132.
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loans." 1 Although interest rate ceilings were not completely
abolished until 1986, significant liberalization had already
occurred in the wholesale market for large CDs and state usu-
ry laws had been preempted. To cover the higher costs of fund-
ing, U.S. banks began pursuing more aggressive lending poli-
cies in search of higher yields. Competition to make loans to
oil, gas and coal producers became so intense during the early
1980s that credit standards began to slip, resulting in a rising
rate of loan defaults.0 2 For example, the 1982 collapse of a
small, but fast growing Oklahoma bank, the Penn Square
Bank, was traced to such risky practices.10 ' Continental Illi-
nois, a large Chicago-based bank that had participated in these
Penn Square loans, was left with huge losses after the Penn
Square collapse, and subsequently was forced to pay higher
rates to depositors and to rely on a larger percentage of foreign
sources for deposits. °4
Continental's loss on Penn Square loans had widespread
effects. In early 1984, rumors of Continental's troubles spread
throughout the financial world."0 5 By the spring of 1984,
large overseas depositors began pulling out of Continental,
withdrawing enormous amounts of CDs in an invisible, com-
puterized run on the bank.0 6 Continental's stock, as high as
$33 a share in January 1982, fell to under $4 by May of
1984.107 Federal regulators were caught in an ideological di-
lemma of their own making. They understood the grave danger
to financial confidence but were hesitant to intervene in the
decisions of the marketplace.0 ' A sell-off of bank stocks en-
sued and the crisis began to spread, threatening Continental's
many creditors, including other large U.S. commercial
banks.0 9 The Keefe Bruyette & Woods Index of twenty-four
101 Statement of Henry Schechter, supra note 9, at 132.
'02 Statement of Henry Schechter, supra note 9, at 132.
... GREIDER, supra note 11, at 522-27; Canova, supra note 78, at 1, 9.
104 See Robert A. Bennett, Chilling Specter at Continental, N.Y. TIMEs, May 20,
1984, § 3, at 1.
106 Id.
106 Id.
107 GREIDER, supra note 11, at 522-27; Canova, supra note 78, at 9.
0' Peter T. Kilborn, The High Stakes Scramble to Rescue Continental Bank,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1984, at Al.
1o9 Id.
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money-center and regional banks fell 5% in one week. °10 In
one day, the price of stock for Manufacturer's Hanover, the
fourth largest U.S. bank, tumbled nearly 10%, driving down
the entire market on rumors of the bank's $6.5 billion exposure
to Latin American debt."'
Initial apprehensions and considerations of ideological
consistency ultimately gave way to practical political calcula-
tion. To stem the run on Continental Illinois and to restore
confidence in the entire system of monetary payments, the
FDIC finally announced that it would insure even the unin-
sured, i.e., deposits in Continental Illinois exceeding the
$100,000 limit. The Federal Reserve Board also opened a $7.5
billion line of cheap credit to Continental Illinois."2 At an
initial cost of $4.5 billion, the bailout was the largest in U.S.
financial history."' The seventh largest bank in the country
was simply "too big to fail."
The sudden meltdown and resulting bailout of Continental
Illinois highlighted the contradictions and hypocrisy of the
free-market policy of deregulation. Though completely ignored
in the 1984 presidential election campaign, the bailout of Con-
tinental Illinois would foreshadow U.S. policy for years to
come. Also ignored during the campaign were predictions that
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC") would be insolvent.14 Debate was stifled, as both
major political parties were implicated in the rush to dereg-
110 GREIDER, supra note 11, at 633; Canova, supra note 78, at 9.
.. See GREMER, supra note 11, at 497-501, 522-24, 628-30 (history of the Conti-
nental Bailout); Robert A. Bennett, A Growing Case of Market Jitters, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 1984, at D1; Canova, supra note 78, at 9; Kilborn, supra note 108, at Al;
Gary Klott, Worries on Banks Jar Markets, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1984, at Di.
m See Bennett, supra note 104, at AS.
* See Bennett, supra note 104, at A8; Winston rflliams, U.S. Puts Together
$7.5 Billion in Aid for Illinois Bank, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1984, at Al. It has
been estimated that the FDIC's total loss stemming from the bailout of Continen-
tal Illinois exceeded $1.7 billion. By President Reagan's final year in office, bailout
had become routine policy. The FDIC rescued the nation's 13th largest bank hold-
ing company, First RepublicBank Corp., in a package totaling $5 billion. Kathleen
Day & John M. Berry, FDIC Rescues Texas Bank With $1 Billion Loan, WASH.
POST, Mar. 18, 1988, at B1.
History repeated itself when the federal government bailed out Continental
Illinois in 1984. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, created during the Great
Depression to rescue failing banks and corporations, had bailed out the same Chi-
cago-based bank 51 years before. See Canova, supra note 78, at 1.
11 Canova, supra note 78, at 9-10.
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ulate. The decline in democratic political debate set a dismal
standard for the future. Four years later, word of a much larg-
er financial bailout of the S&L industry was greeted by politi-
cians and a compliant media with deafening silence."5 Voters
would wake up after election day with a daunting hangover of
tax, debt, and interest burdens.
V. THE REAGAN LEGACY: PASSING THE BUCKET
From 1942 to 1980, only 198 U.S. banks failed, an average
of less than 6 failures per year. But in 1987 alone, 184 U.S.
banks failed. In 1989 and 1990, another 362 U.S. banks
failed."6 From 1934 to 1973, the FDIC incurred losses of
$124.3 million in rescue packages.1 7 By the early 1990s, tens
of billions of dollars already had been spent to begin the pro-
cess of bailing out the savings and loan industry. The General
Accounting Office estimated the total cost of the bailout to be
over $500 billion. With accrued interest burdens stemming
from high real interest rates the expected total cost could ex-
ceed $1 trillion. 8 By any measure, the resolution of the sav-
ings and loan collapse had become the most costly financial
bailout and one of the largest spending programs in the
... During the 1992 election campaign, some analysts warned of a similar crisis
looming over the commercial banking industry. Jerry Knight, Buttressing the Big
Banks, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1991, at 11 ("America's largest banks are in bigger
trouble than government officials and the banks themselves have publicly admit-
ted, and many congressional and private banking experts question whether the
industry will be able to solve its problems without direct help from taxpayers.");
Leslie Wayne, Bank Profits: Weakest 2d Quarter Since '87, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1991, at D1 ("A lot of people who look at the banking problems are quick to see
another savings-and-loan situation."). The Federal Reserve's subsidization policy
(providing banks with a low cost of funds through a low discount rate, while al-
lowing banks to play the spread on higher yielding government securities) appar-
ently has forestalled the crisis for now by artificially propping up bank profits. See
infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
,' Arnold, supra note 86, at 264; AM. BANKER, Jan. 5, 1988, at 1.
"17 GOLEMBE & HENGREN, supra note 7, at 30, 38.
... HIXSON, supra note 36, at 220. As a result over 25% of the federal budget
deficit problem had become "off-budget" by 1992. See William F. Hixson, The 1993
Budget Debate, EcON. REFORM, Sept. 1993, at 8 ("The largest component of the
off-budget deficit is money for the bailout of failed banks and savings and loan
associations"). Both on-budget and off-budget figures, however, may be revised
downward as the method of financing the bailouts shifts from RTC-type resolution
of failing financial institutions to the Fed's back-door subsidy of the banking and
thrift industries. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
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nation's history.
While the process of bank inspection was largely shielded
from press and public scrutiny throughout the 1980s and early
1990s,"' investigative journalists documented a wide range
of systematic fraud and corruption,12 including easy plea
bargains and sweetheart deals for the well-connected. It would
be an understatement to conclude that two successive Repub-
lican presidents, along with the Democratic-controlled congres-
sional oversight committees, fell asleep at the wheel. So many
vested interests were tied into the structure of high real inter-
est rates and federal receivership that the entire banking sys-
tem appeared transmuted, guarding a sacred welfare cow for
society's powerful.12'
In the public's imagination, the "S&L Scandal' came to
evoke all that had gone wrong in the American political sys-
tem. Yet it would be all too easy to sweep the blame of the
financial collapse under the rug of fraud and corruption, to
exonerate the professional economists and policymakers who
had lifted the lid on the Pandora's box. Major legislative re-
... For example, the Freedom of Information Act provides a disclosure exception
for the "examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or
for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial
institutions." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1988).
"0 For instance, a Department of Justice investigation into the multi-billion
dollar plundering of Texas S&Ls by associates of the Marcello Mafia family of
New Orleans was reportedly stopped in its tracks under the pretense of "national
security" as a result of intervention by the CIA. See, e.g., STEPHEN P7ZO ET AL.,
INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS (1989); The Great
S&L Robbery, TEX. OBSERVER, Apr. 5, 1991, at 1; Pete Brewton, S&L Probe Has
Possible CIA Links: Authorities Target Houston Developer, HOUSTON POST, Feb. 4,
1990, at Al; Stephen Pizzo, Probe into CIA-Thrift Links, NATIONAL THRIFT &
MORTGAGE NEWS, Feb. 12, 1990, at 1.
The secrecy surrounding this alleged CIA-underworld alliance understandably
feeds public cynicism as well as conspiracy paranoia: where and when did such an
unholy alliance begin and where does it end? See JOHN H. DAVIS, MAFIA
KINGFISH: CARLOS MARCELLO AND THE ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY (1988);
PETER D. ScoTT, DEEP POLITICS AND THE DEATH OF JFK 208 (1993); The Men
Who Killed Kennedy, Television Documentary by Investigative Reports (produced by
Bill Kurtis, 1992); see also Jeff Gerth, The Business Dealings of the President's
Relatives: What the Record Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1992, at 14; Jonathan
Kwitny, The Real S&L Scandal: All the President's Friends, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct.
20, 1992, at 24.
" As the "Keating Five" demonstrated, one hand washes the other. During the
1980s, thrifts made $11 million in direct contributions to elected officials of both
major political parties. Commercial banks gave even more. L.J. Davis, Chronicle of
a Debacle Foretold, HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 1990, at 64.
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forms had transformed managed lending behavior into system-
atic mismanagement simply by raising real interest rates to
usurious levels, thereby raising the failure and foreclosure
rates for legitimate borrowers." Unfortunately, those lessons
have not been learned. Instead, public debate has focused on
the pace of future deregulation, such as proposed assaults on
the Glass-Steagall "fire-wall" prohibitions between commercial
and investment banking." Even as financial deregulation
has continued to threaten the free enterprise system by its
very excesses, blame has fallen on a regulatory regime largely
dismantled and relegated to the past.
From the beginning, financial deregulation was intended
to result in increased competition between financial institu-
tions. According to the logic of the marketplace, competition
would reward the successful and discipline the inefficient.
Experience has shown, however, that the failure of large finan-
cial institutions presents grave risks to public confidence in the
monetary payments system, particularly in a credit economy.
Confidence must be safeguarded zealously. Such were the
considerations that led to passage of the New Deal Banking
Acts in the first place.
It was during the Reagan years that a new regulatory
model finally emerged, replacing the regime that had been
erected fifty years earlier. The bailout of Continental Illinois
served as the blueprint for government policy in dealing with
the biggest marketplace losers. In an incredible display of
administrative discretion and political favoritism, the FDIC
2 Keith Bradsher, N.Y. TIMIES, Bank Regulators Taking Close Look at Lending
Risks, Apr. 9, 1995, § 1, at 1, 36 ("The regulators' new worries this year follow
shifts in bank activities prompted by rising interest rates."). For a graphic depic-
tion of the rise in the volume of real estate repossessed by banks throughout the
recessionary 1990 to 1992 period, see Banks Report Decline in Repossessed Real
Estate, BANK RESOLUTION REP., Mar. 29, 1993, at 2.
In addition, variable rate loans and loans of shorter maturities shifted the
risks of rising interest rates from lenders to home-borrowers, thereby increasing
the incidence of business failure and foreclosure. Statement of Henry Schechter,
supra note 9, at 136-38.
3 Franklin R. Edwards, Can Regulatory Reform Prevent the Impending Disaster
in Financial Markets?, 73 ECON. REV. 1, 36-37 (Jan. 1988); G. Sellon, Jr., Restruc-
turing the Financial System: Summary of the Bank's 1987 Symposium, 73 ECON.
REV. 1 (Jan. 1988). The Clinton administration officially has joined in the effort to
repeal the Glass-Steagall Act. Keith Bradsher, Rubin's Plan for Banking Spurs
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995, at D1.
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began to insure even uninsured depositors."4 Such discre-
tionary power effectively "socialized" the risk and eliminated
the costs of failure for those interests that were sufficiently
organized to influence and control the bureaucratic agen-
cies."
In his first year in office, President George Bush signed
into law the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), which created the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation ('RTC") and empowered it to resolve
the savings and loan crisis by assuming the assets and collat-
eral of hundreds of failed thrifts across the country.'26 The
RTC quickly became the largest holder of real estate and junk
bonds in the country.' As a result, it became caught in a
124 As recently as 1979, Theodore Lowi referred to the FDIC as an example of
a federal agency that was politically-accountable and operating within clearly de-
fined legal parameters. The FDIC's pivotal role in the vast financial bailouts of
the 1980s and 1990s, however, breathes renewed life into the analytical construct
of Lowi's "state of permanent receivership." See LOWI, supra note 35, at 281; see
also, Day & Berry, supra note 113; Nathaniel C. Nash, Large Texas Bank To Get
$1 Billion in Federal Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1988, at Al (to avert a finan-
cial panic, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board guaranteed all depositors and
creditors of the nation's second largest savings and loan).
Other federal agencies, such as the Federal Reserve Board and the RTC,
wield unbounded discretionary power as well, "picking winners and losers" as a
routine matter of policy. See HIXSON, supra note 36, at 165. In the words of Mil-
ton Friedman, "no major institution in the United States has so poor a record of
performance over so long a period of time yet so high a public reputation as the
Federal Reserve," which according to Friedman is guilty of "churning" the
government's accounts to generate huge commissions for securities dealers. Id. The
Federal Reserve's help for its big banking clientele contrasts sharply with its deci-
sion to permit Harlem's Freedom National Bank to fail. See Stepanie Strom,
Failed Dreams: The Collapse of a Harlem Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1990, at Al.
"2 The Supreme Court has continually upheld broad delegations of discretionary
power to the Federal Reserve Board. Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst.,
450 U.S. 46 (1981); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207
(1984). Some scholars have advocated the revival of the nondelegation doctrine to
ensure accountability in the policymaking process. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 67, at
132-33.
" Marirose K. Lescher & Merwin A. Mace M]1 Financing the Bailout of the
Thrift Crisis: Workings of the Financing Corporation and the Resolution Funding
Corporation, 46 BUs. LAW. 507 (1991).
" See Stephen Labaton, The Bailout Agency Becomes a Highly Motivated Seller,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, § 4, at 4; Nathaniel C. Nash, U.S. Must Unload
30,000 Properties, And Please Don't Ask How's Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25 1990,
§ 4, at 4. With a caseload of 76,000 legal matters, the RTC also has become the
nation's largest consumer of private legal services. It expects to spend more than
$800 million on legal fees to seize bankrupt S&Ls and sell their assets. John H.
Cushman Jr., Needed: Minority Lawyers for Big Job, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1993, at
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regulatory catch-22: whether to hold on to the foreclosed prop-
erties and incur high carrying and maintenance costs or sell
quickly, undercut the market, and depress real estate values
through fire sales at auction."
Unfortunately, there was no significant discussion of other
reform proposals. Alternative proposals such as foreclosure
moratoriums, re-capping of interest rates on loans, and other
direct assistance to mortgagors, which were adopted in one
form or another by federal and state governments during
Roosevelt's New Deal, were not considered. Rather than bail-
out from above for the moneylenders, such alternative mea-
sures were designed to bailout from below to prevent asset
values from deteriorating in the first place simply by prevent-
ing distress foreclosure sales.'29 Instead, the RTC auctions
proceeded. Within a year the markets for junk bonds".. and
real estate were depressed and homebuilding began to de-
cline.' 3'
The bailout program itself seemed to grow in size and
scope with the passage of time. If foreclosure, followed by RTC
auctions, had the effect of glutting a depressed real estate
market, then the resulting decline in real estate values could
depress bank share prices and raise the risk premium banks
had to pay in the deposit and bond markets by eroding the
B16.
" Resolution Trust Corporation's Asset Disposition Policies: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on General Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
" For instance, in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934), the Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota mortgage moratorium act which
extended the period of redemption from foreclosure sales. At the federal level, the
Home Owners' Loan Act and the Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 provided loan and
mortgage refinancing for tens of thousands of farmers and homeowners facing
foreclosure. MLLER, supra note 68, at 315-16.
"3o Anise C. Wallace, The Big Bailout. Federal Holding of Risky 'Junk Bonds'
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1990, at D5; Glenn Yago, The Regulatory Reign of
Terror, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1992, at A12 (in the Fall of 1989, FIRREFA forced
thrifts to liquidate their junk bond portfolios, causing prices to plummet and de-
stroying once-healthy S&Ls).
"' Peter Cary & Stephen J. Hedges, Can't Anybody Here Sell Some Property?,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 10, 1990, at 56; Steve Lohr, Banking's Real Es-
tate Miseries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, § 3, at 1; Iver Peterson, Home Builders
See Recession and Blame the Savings Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1990, at Al;
Joseph F. Sullivan, New Boom Hits Suburbs: Evictions and Foreclosures, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1991, at B1.
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capital of otherwise solvent banks."2 In the midst of such
market conditions, an unplanned credit crunch developed.
Banks became much more hesitant to make loans and were
content simply to purchase high-yielding, low-risk government
securities.133 This situation was a fitting outcome for a reces-
sion-ridden rentier economy in a state of permanent receiver-
ship.
The post-Reagan era has witnessed a significant evolution
of this bailout model. By 1992 the largest U.S. commercial
banks desperately needed a huge cash infusion to make up for
the enormous rise in nonperforming assets-i.e., bad loans-to
add to their reserves and to restore capital positions. The au-
thorities apparently determined that the economic and political
risks were too great to repeat the S&L bailout blueprint. This
time, the banks would not be permitted to get to the RTC reso-
lution stage. Instead, the Federal Reserve Board effectively
subsidized U.S. commercial banks with low-cost funds, such as
a low discount rate, while allowing the banks to boost their
profits and play the artificial spread in interest rates through
purchasing higher yielding government securities. Banks virtu-
ally stopped lending, bought Treasury bonds, and reported
record earnings.'
The bailout model was therefore refined to hide its true
costs from the American voter. But, of course, someone had to
foot the bill. By 1993 U.S. taxpayers were providing more than
$200 billion annually as high real interest on the federal
government's debt obligations. These congressional appropria-
132 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, supra note 93, at 163; Rise in Loan
Delinquency, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1991, at 42; John M. Berry, Warning Signs of
Death Spiral on Bank Credit, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1990, at HI; Robert Hanley,
After the Heady 1980s, A Hangover of Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1990, at
B1; Louis Uchitelle, 3 Big Banks Reporting Loan Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990,
at D1.
' Finance: In Search of Borrowers, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 1993, at 71; Martin
Mayer, Why Lend? Banks Have the Fed, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1992, at A14.
1' See First-Quarter 1993 Bank Earnings Hit New Record High Level Of $10.9
Billion, 60 BANKING REP. (BNA) 873 (June 14, 1993); Louis Uchitelle, Slump in
Business Lending Has Prime Rate Stuck at 6%, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1993, at D1.
For yet another method by which central banks now effectively subsidize the prof-
its of currency traders and speculators and commercial bankers, see Saul Hansell,
Europe's Turmoil Aids U.S. Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at D1; Floyd Norris,
Central Banks Make it Easy to Bet Big on a Sure Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1993, at D1.
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tions were routinely attributed to the size of the national debt
and excessive spending on social programs unrelated to the
huge banking subsidy. In short, they were attributed to any
factor but the real culprit-the real market rate of interest.
Those characterizations ignored the reality that a reduction in
the real rate of interest on the Treasury's debt obligations
would result in tremendous reductions in the federal govern-
ment's annual budget deficit. 35 The hidden subsidy to U.S.
commercial banks effectively saddled American consumers and
businesses alike with higher relative debt burdens while tak-
ing billions of dollars from the backpockets of U.S. taxpayers.
VI. A MATTER OF REAL INTEREST136
The American experience in the 1920s demonstrated the
practical dangers of structuring an economic system on high
interest debt. By enforcing a low interest rate structure, the
New Deal reforms successfully restored stability to the private
banking system. 7 Beginning in 1951, however, that regula-
's With a national debt exceeding $4 trillion for each reduction of one percent
in the federal government's average interest rate burden, the annual federal deficit
would be reduced by approximately $40 billion. 1993 ECONOMIC REPORT, supra
note 13, at 246. A return to low interest rates comparable to the "pegged" rates
that prevailed throughout World War II would provide the federal government
with an "interest dividend" of many tens of billions of dollars each year. Such
funds could be used to stimulate demand, cut taxes, finance military to civilian
conversion, invest in infrastructure, finance health insurance reforms, education
and training programs, build housing, provide public sector jobs and/or reduce the
deficit.
" For many centuries, lending at high interest rates has been considered mor-
ally indefensible, violating religious dictates and the laws of civil society. See, e.g.,
The Bible: Exod. 22:25; Neh. 5:7; Prov. 28:8; Lev. 25:36; Ps. 15:5; Ezek. 18:08,
18:13, 18:17, 22:12; Matt. 6:12, 18:27, 18:30, 18:32; see also The Koran (N.J.
Dagwood trans., 4th ed. 1974): Sura 11:276, ]m:130, XXX:39; THE POLITICS OF
ARISTOTLE 29 (Ernest Barker trans., 1978). In acknowledging the primary purpose
of money "as a means of exchange" Aristotle also recognized that "usury" (the
charging of interest) tries to make money increase as though it were an end in
itself. "The trade of the petty usurer," said Aristotle, "is hated most, and with
most reason: it makes a profit from currency itself, instead of making it from the
process [i.e. of exchange] which currency was meant to serve." Id. at 28-29. To the
extent that usury interferes with such exchange of goods or capital, it may conflict
with other pseudo-Christian justifications of supply-side (i.e., trickle-down) capi-
talism. See GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1980) (the act of investment is
a gift from the investor to the community).
" "The acuteness and the peculiarity of our contemporary problem arises,
therefore, out of the possibility that the average rate of interest which will allow a
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tory regime was successively undermined and ultimately was
dismantled during Ronald Reagan's presidency.3 '
A. Assessing the Financial Battlefield
The legacy of the Reagan administration's eight years of
financial deregulation and speculative cheerleading has only
grown with the passage of time, largely because of the unwill-
ingness and inability of policymakers to question the basic
underlying premises of deregulation. The liberalization of de-
pository interest rates and the lifting of interest rate prohibiti-
ons on demand deposits have necessarily resulted in higher
real interest rates, particularly in the tight money environ-
ment dictated by the Fed. As a result, U.S. financial institu-
tions have been forced to bid up depository interest rates to
attract funds. Banks and thrifts have passed on the costs of
higher depository rates to debtors by charging higher interest
rates on loans. The result has been a growing interest burden
on public and private debt; increased business failures, bank-
ruptcies, and mortgage foreclosures; a steep decline in the level
of homeownership; deteriorating loan portfolios for commercial
banks and savings and loans; and, finally, a financial bailout of
epic proportions in the 1990s.'39
Ronald Reagan's presidency began with the wholesale
deregulation of depository interest rates, which eventually
subjected banks to virtually unfettered price competition. By
the end of President Reagan's first term, however, the federal
reasonable average level of employment is one so unacceptable to the wealth-own-
ers that it cannot be readily established by manipulating the quantity of money."
KEYNES, supra note 10, at 308-09. Statute, custom and moral dictates were, there-
fore, required to keep interest rates at low enough levels to ensure full employ-
ment. Id. at 351.
" Liberals and conservatives alike auctioned their principles to powerful pri-
vate interests, throwing both caution and discipline to the wind. While the respon-
sibility for dismantling 50 years of regulatory protections cannot be confined to
one party or one branch of government, the fact is that most of the significant
developments occurred during Ronald Reagan's watch.
" On the declining rate of homeownership and rising homelessness, see PHIL-
LIPS, supra note 53, at 22, 183-84, 251 (App. I-1). Should real rates of interest be
reduced to appropriately low levels, then total debt burdens on both public and
private sectors would be reduced accordingly. Both the public and private sectors
would then be able to increase investment spending. HDISON, supra note 36, at
258.
1995] 337
BROOtLYNVLAWREVIEW
government was forced to interfere with market outcomes by
rescuing the nation's seventh largest commercial bank from
collapse. Bailout, as the pattern if not the exact blueprint, has
dominated to this day. The interest rate structure permits, and
even encourages, the failure of those at the bottom of the eco-
nomic pyramid, while those at the top benefit from a policy of
"lemon socialism."'4 The federal government subsidizes the
losses of the wealthy by propping up a failing system in which
self-interest masquerades as free-market principle and public
debate is stifled by the requirements of so-called "expertise."
The ultimate irony is that the proponents of unrestricted capi-
talism gladly have accepted federal bailouts to protect them-
selves from the same intensified competition that they helped
to bring about.
While it has been estimated that only 20% of the wealth
and income redistributions that occurred during the Reagan
era were the result of changes in the tax code (i.e., 80% result-
ed from high interest rates and deregulation of various indus-
tries),14 ' political debate continues to concentrate on fiscal
remedies to the top-heavy distribution of wealth and income.
Those who advocate raising taxes on the rich are accused of
trying to play Robin Hood.' Yet it would be more accurate
.4. If socialism is a system of public ownership of the means of production,
"lemon socialism" refers to a system of government purchase and/or subsidy for
unproductive or failing sectors of the economy. The government buys a lemon
rather than nationalizing a Cadillac.
141 PHILLIPS, supra note 53, at 241 (Appendix B), 101-15 (deregulation, money
and debt as powerful redistributive levers); Keith Bradsher, Gap in Wealth in U.S.
Called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al, C4; Nasar, supra note
53, at D24.
1 In 1944, President Franklin Roosevelt recognized that full employment was a
necessary condition to the attainment of individual freedom. FDR called for a
Second American Bill of Rights (an Economic Bill of Rights) to include the right to
useful and remunerative employment for all Americans. Public Papers and Ad-
dresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1944-1945, at 32, 41 (State of the Union Address,
Jan. 11, 1944); see also id. at 371 (Campaign Address, Oct. 28, 1944) & 503 (State
of the Union Address, Jan. 6, 1945).
By settling for far less than full employment, the Democratic Party now finds
itself advocating a narrower conception of justice based on group rights and affir-
mative action, opening itself up to criticism that it has become "the party of quo-
tas." Appropriately, the RTC bailout agency has come under pressure to abide by
affirmative action standards. Cushman, supra note 127, at B16.
The game of musical chairs provides a useful analogy in the full employment
versus affirmative action debate: when the music stops, we may divide up the
seats (i.e., jobs) based on divisive criteria such as gender, race, ethnic or national
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to conclude that the Fed is quietly playing the part of the
Sheriff of Nottingham by powerfully redistributing wealth to
the haves at the expense of the have-nots by dictating the
century's highest sustained real interest rates.
Since the late 1970s, real interest rates for most individu-
als, businesses, and all levels of government have remained at
unprecedented levels, more than triple the historical aver-
age.' The massive redistributions of wealth and income
have continued unabated into the Presidency of Bill Clinton.
This consequence may be the most troubling and least recog-
nized effect of financial deregulation and high real interest
rates. The vast redistribution of wealth and income from con-
sumers to creditor and rentier groups has constituted a drag
on the continued expansion of consumer purchasing power and
effective aggregate demand, resulting in an unsustainable
"debt overhang."'44 When the rate of interest rises faster
origin (i.e., minority set-asides, quotas and immigration restrictions) or we may
work to expand the number of seats so that all who play will find security and
happiness.
" See supra note 83 and accompanying text. The Fed's interest rate hikes may
constitute the largest "unfunded federal mandate" on state and local governments.
Rising interest rates add hundreds of millions of dollars to the debt servicing costs
of all levels of government. According to Senator Byron Dorgan, the Fed's interest
rate increases in 1994 alone increased the cost of the federal government's debt
service over the next five years by nearly $125 billion, taking back nearly one-
fourth of the Clinton administration's deficit reduction savings. The total cost to
the private sector from the Fed's 1994 interest rate increases was about $43.7
billion per year, or a total of at least $218 billion over the next five years. 141
CONG. REC. S755 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dorgan); Summary
of Dorgan Amendment to S. 1, the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995
(amendment would have required the Federal Reserve Board to report to Congress
and the President about the anticipated costs of changes in interest rates on the
public and private sectors).
"' Throughout 1993, much of Wall Street cheered the decline in both real and
nominal interest rates. Businesses paying near-prime rates of six or seven percent
as well as higher rates on earlier loans, however, were still having difficulty ser-
vicing their debts in an economic environment where income and profits were
rising by only one or two percent. This suggests that minimally lower interest
rates, by themselves, may not spark recovery. Steven Greenhouse, With Rates This
Low, Where's the Boom?, N.Y. TIES, Aug. 24, 1993, at D1 (economist Henry
Kaufman concludes that a much larger decline in interest rates may be required
to stimulate the economy "because we have gone through a great debt explosion
that has immobilized many borrowers and financial institutions").
This also explains the on-going need to "restructure," consolidate and layoff
workers during a period of slow growth. Cost-cutting is needed to increase revenue
to finance the debt overhang. See infra note 151. However, the cumulative effect
of such cost-cutting is to further reduce aggregate demand, profits and income.
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than both consumer prices and wages, it eats into private and
public income, leaving us poorer as individuals and as a na-
tion. 1
45
The experiment in financial deregulation has been an
abject failure in meeting its most important public policy objec-
tives. The multi-billion dollar government interventions, bail-
outs, and subsidies reveal the failure of deregulation to deliver
its promise of greater economic efficiency, while the massive
redistributions of wealth and income stemming from high real
interest rates demonstrate a policy that fails all tests of equity
and fairness.'
46
B. Reforming Substantive Policy
Past U.S. experience suggests that it is entirely possible to
replace the hypocrisy and illusion of deregulation with a regu-
latory system that both achieves public policy objectives and
makes the bureaucracy more democratically accountable. While
debate has been greatly constrained by the mythology of lib-
eralism, it is highly deceptive to characterize the bi-partisan
program of financial deregulation as "liberalization." If exer-
cised through democratically accountable political institutions,
The declines in aggregate income resulting from private restructuring and public
budget cuts will of course necessitate even further cuts in interest rates if busi-
nesses and individuals are to meet their debt payments.
"4' Rising interest rates contribute to a high level of unemployment. (The official
jobless rate grossly underestimates the magnitude of unemployment and under-
employment in the U.S. since it does not include millions of part-time and discour-
aged workers, those who have dropped out of the labor market completely, or
those incarcerated in prison.) Rising levels of unemployment are, in turn, corre-
lated with increases in homicide, suicide, admissions to state mental hospitals and
deaths from cirrhosis of the liver associated with alcoholism. ROBERT L. LINEBERRY
ET AL., GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND POLICY 638 (1993) (citing
M. I-HARvEY BRENNER, ESTIMATING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH, AND CRIMINAL AGGRES-
SION (1976)). Lower real interest rates and a return to levels of full employ-
ment-i.e., reductions in joblessness from present unofficial double-digit rates to
less than three percent-should result in very significant reductions in each of
these indices of social pathology.
' Some analysts may conclude that there will be no change in policy as long
as those with power and influence in American society continue to find financial
deregulation to be in their private interest. Indeed, such a shift in the political
pendulum may require even harder times and more widespread harm to the public
interest and general welfare, a prospect not unlikely, given the magnitude of the
Clinton administration's budgetary austerity.
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regulation of the marketplace is not incompatible with liberty.
Rather, it is the abdication of such responsible self-government
that may constrain liberty, shackling individuals to coercive
forces completely unresponsive to considerations of the general
welfare.
147
In a political system characterized by interest group plu-
ralism, official government policies all too often reflect the
private interests of those individuals and groups that are most
organized and most capable of devoting large financial resourc-
es to the processes of political lobbying. The public interest,
however, is more than the sum of such private interests. It
includes the interests of those lacking in such financial re-
sources and organizational capabilities. Public policy should
reflect the public interest and promote the general welfare.
To that end, the doctrine of usury "deserves rehabilitation and
honour." Unfortunately, that doctrine has all but disap-
peared from the legal lexicon of public administration. 0
Lending at high interest rates is no longer considered to be
usury: it is considered natural and normal. But there is noth-
ing natural or predetermined about the present policies in
banking and finance, or the institutional relationships that
result in protection and bailout for the well-connected and high
debt burdens for everyone else.
In the field of finance, the measures necessary to end the
massive redistributions of wealth are the same as those re-
quired to boost investment and employment: namely, signifi-
cant and sustained reductions in real depository and lending
141 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE FREE CITIZEN 139 (1956) ("Individual initia-
tive . . . may be crushed out just as effectively by the unchecked growth of pri-
vate [power] . . . if the state does not interfere at all."); see also VACLAV HAVEL,
DISTURBING THE PEACE 16 (Paul Wilson trans., 1990) (concluding that "some de-
gree of minimal regulation is essential").
"' See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (the purpose of constitutional government is the pro-
motion of the general welfare; power emanates from the people and is to be exer-
cised for their benefit); see also HAVEL, supra note 147, at 16 ("Any eventual cen-
tral regulation of this variegated economic scene . . . should be based on nothing
more than a highly evolved sensitivity to what contributes to the general good of
the human being, and what, on the contrary, limits and destroys it.").
14, KEYNES, supra note 10, at 351. For a striking example of the inverse rela-
tionship between debt and freedom, see James Brooke, Slavery on Rise in Brazil
As Debt Chains Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1993, at 3.
... See, e.g., Fleets High-Interest Second Mortgage Lending Upheld By Georgia
Supreme Court, 60 BANKING REP. (BNA) 928 (June 21, 1993).
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interest rates. Low real interest rates would have the positive
effects of: (1) reducing the federal budget deficit by reducing
the servicing charges on the national debt; (2) increasing mort-
gage lending, homebuilding and productive investment in in-
dustry; (3) encouraging consumer borrowing; (4) contributing
greatly to the achievement of fall employment of capital and
human resources;151 (5) restoring the long-run profitability of
balance sheets of commercial banks; and (6) ending the redis-
tribution of wealth and income from consumers and other
borrowing groups to lenders and rentiers.
If the United States is to achieve these objectives, interest
rates must be reduced for ordinary working Americans and
businesses. There is no justifiable macroeconomic reason for
double-digit interest rates on credit card, commercial and mort-
gage loans, particularly in an environment of low inflation. 52
All branches and organs of the government, from Congress to
the presidency and the federal bureaucracies, must find the
political will to impose limitations on market interest rates
while forging a broader social consensus to restrain prices and
wages. Such a policy is the only viable and humane alternative
to the anti-inflationary policy of tight money and high real in-
terest rates.
The Fed, in coordination with foreign central banks,
should enforce market interest rates which straddle the infila-
'" While the high real interest rates since 1980 have left the U.S. economy
with a huge debt overhang in both the public and private sectors, reductions in
real interest rates may ultimately prove insufficient to revive consumer and busi-
ness confidence. But while high real interest rates are capable of pulling down the
economy, reductions in such interest rates will not result in increased borrowing
or investment when there has been a collapse in confidence. In such an environ-
ment, monetary policy is more akin to "pushing a string through a hole". If the
present craze for fiscal austerity results in economic contraction and recession,
then the monetary authorities may be unable to reinflate effective demand. See
supra note 144. This suggests that a looser monetary policy is a necessary, but
possibly not sufficient, condition to economic growth and job expansion.
..2 While banks argue that high interest rates and bank fees on consumer loans
reflect the higher marginal costs of originating small loans, there are compelling
public policy reasons for having large transactions subsidize the mass of smaller
transactions. Such cross-subsidization of consumer interest rates would ensure that
the default rate on consumer loans remains at manageable levels. Furthermore, in
light of the history of massive subsidies granted to lending institutions as well as
the market protections afforded to such institutions in the form of licensing and
chartering requirements, considerations of justice require that consumers receive
more equitable treatment.
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tion rate-i.e., a real rate of interest which approaches zero
percent or even negative levels.'53 Certainly a private bank-
ing system can survive and flourish even with negative real
interest rates. This was demonstrated during the hey-day of
the New Deal regulatory regime as the higher quality bank
assets and greater stability of bank balance sheets were ob-
tainable via a low interest rate regime. As a practical matter,
even with low or negative real interest rates, banks could still
protect their profitability by charging higher rates on loans
than they pay to depositors."
Due to recessionary conditions, by mid-1993 nominal inter-
est rates had declined to their lowest levels in over twenty
years. While interest rates on consumer, mortgage and com-
mercial loans had remained significantly above the rate of
inflation, money market rates were as low or lower than the
inflation rate. Depository interest rates were, in many cases,
below the old Regulation Q levels. A window of opportunity
has opened to restore minimum legal standards of real decency
to relations between lenders and borrowers. 5 That effort
1" In mid-1993, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed concern that real
interest rates were below zero. His benchmark for measuring real interest rates,
however, was the federal funds rate, the rate at which banks lend reserves to
each other overnight. For millions of consumers and thousands of businesses, the
real rate of interest remained well into the double digits. Greenhouse, supra note
54, at D2.
Nobel-laureate economist Paul Samuelson has recognized that negative short-
term real interest rates are necessary in a time of recession or prolonged weak-
ness in a recovery to induce greater private capital formation. Commenting favor-
ably on the Fed's pre-1951 pegging policy, Samuelson has concluded: "In the years
when the price index accelerated to two percent per annum or above, was it a
mistake that treasury bills chronically bore yields of half a percent per annum
and garnered negative real interest returns. According to the new dogma it was a
mistake, even though the unemployment rate still hovered around 15 percent!"
Paul A. Samuelson, Leaning Against What Inflationary Wind?, CHALLENGE, Sept.-
Oct. 1993, at 20, 24, 26.
"" In addition to the spread between depository interest rates and lending in-
terest rates, other factors which support the profitability of the commercial bank-
ing industry include: (1) the strict licensing requirements and other artificially
high barriers to entry into the banking industry that have been justified by con-
siderations of bank safety and soundness; and (2) the charging of various bank
fees, many of which already exceed fair and reasonable levels. See U.S. PUBLIC
INTEREST RES. GROUP & CONSUMER FEDN OF AM., THE 1993 PIR/CFA NATIONAL
BANK FEE SURVEY (June 1993); Banking Fees Skyrocketing, 60 BANING REP.
(BNA) 878 (June 14, 1993).
' At the dawn of the twentieth century, a famous Austrian economist, Eugen
von Bohm Bawerk, declared that the level of a nation's interest rates reflects the
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could proceed with a reform of monetary policy and a revival of
the law of usury.
C. Reforming the Policymaking Process
In banking and finance, as in all areas of public policy,
process influences and often dictates substantive outcome. A
change in policy therefore requires reform of the policy making
process, from the way that we elect our Congressional repre-
sentatives and Chief Executive to the structures and processes
of the Federal Reserve Board and other bureaucratic agencies.
In a democracy, we expect that pivotal issues will be wide-
ly debated. Yet, throughout the past two decades, both the
Republican and Democratic presidential candidates virtually
have ignored the most important legislative and regulatory
changes imposed on the nation's financial system."6 Certain-
ly the 1992 presidential election campaign failed to offer any
choices to American voters on such fundamental issues as the
structure of the nation's central bank and the formulation of
monetary policy.'57
cultural level of its civilization: the lower the rate of interest, the higher the
people's intelligence, cultural level and moral strength. HOMER & SYLLA, supra
note 70, at 3-4, 200.
'1 The commercialization of the most important mass medium of information
and communication-the television airwaves-has adversely impacted the quality of
our public debate. In 1968 the average length of a network sound bite was nearly
45 seconds. By 1988, the average sound bite lasted less than 10 seconds. KIKU
ADATTO, SOUND BITE DEMOCRACY: NETWORK EVENING NEWS PRESIDENTIAL CAM-
PAIGN COVERAGE, 1968 AND 1988, at 4 (Harvard University, John F. Kennedy
School of Gov't, Research Paper R-2, June 1990); Daniel Hallin, Sound Bite News:
Television Coverage of Elections, 1968-1988, J. COMM., Spring 1992, at 12.
It is therefore no small wonder that commercial television was unwilling
and/or incapable of presenting discussion of complex issues or that the level of
debate degenerated into macho posturing aimed at maximum use of sound-bite
coverage (i.e., "Read my lips: no new taxes."). To compare this present-day reality
with past reform efforts, see Mary A. Watson, The New Frontier and the Vast
Wasteland, in JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE PROMISE REVISITED 261 (Paul Harper &
Joann P. Krieg eds., 1988).
'"' The Clinton Administration's plan to create 100 new community development
banks (designed by the President's National Economic Council) to extend low-inter-
est credit to poor neighborhoods could be seen as an attempt to circumvent the
Fed's high interest rate grip on the economy and the existing private commercial
banking domination of the Federal Reserve System. RVD Secretary Says Commu-
nity Development Banks Will Use Banks, Thrifts, and Credit Unions, WASH. INSID-
ER (BNA), Mar. 4, 1993; see also HYMAN P. MINSKY ET AL., COMMUNITY DEVELOP-
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In fact, the similarities between the two major political
parties now far outweigh the differences on the most signifi-
cant issues affecting the economy-monetary, fiscal and regu-
latory policies. Both parties are increasingly dependent on
powerful private interests to raise money for thirty-second
television spots to get their simplified messages across to vot-
ers. ' This dependency may explain why administration after
administration permits a system in which their central banks
subsidize rentiers, creditors, private speculators, currency
traders and commercial bankers at the public's expense.
Administrations, whether Democratic or Republican, are now
less accountable to electorates than to the private interests
which finance their increasingly expensive political campaigns.
The Federal Reserve System has become the most impor-
tant vehicle by which the elected branches of government
evade responsibility for the adoption of policies that favor the
financial elite at the public's expense. Structural change there-
fore should begin with the Fed. While the Constitution gives
Congress the exclusive right to coin money, that power is effec-
tively farmed out to the private bankers which dominate the
Fed.'59 Such broad legislative delegations of power effectively
permit bureaucratic agencies such as the Fed to "pick winners
and losers" while shielding agency deliberations from the scru-
tiny of open public debate. The necessities of reform require
nothing less than a genuine reinvention of government. 60
MENT BANKING: A PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A NATIONWIDE SYSTEM OF COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT BANKS 9 (Jerome Levy Economics Inst. of Bard College, Public Pol'y
Brief No. 3, 1993). Even under such commendable proposals, however, a network
of community development banks could remain at the mercy of general economic
conditions dictated by conservative financial forces entrenched at the Fed.
"ZB See Michael Wines, Candidates for Congress Spent Record $678 Million, a
52% Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at A12.
"' According to former Congressman Wright Patman, 'tinder the Constitution,
it is the right and duty of Congress to create money. It is left entirely to Con-
gress. Congress has farmed out this power-has let it out to the banking system."
MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS 23 (1974); see also U.S. CONST., art. L, § 8, el. 5
("The Congress shall have Power ... To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof,
and of foreign Coin.").
... Steven Greenhouse, Gonzalez Intensifies Battle With Fed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1993, at D2 (according to Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, the Federal Reserve System
is the only agency in which "actual decision-making power [is] vested in individu-
als who are formally accountable to private parties instead of to the public");
Clinton Says No To Gonzalez Federal Reserve Bill, NATL JOURNAL'S CONGRESS
DAILY, Sept. 24, 1993 (stating that the Gonzalez bill would increase the number of
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Major reform of this institutional structure has been in-
peded by the broad legislative delegations ironically permitted
by a distinctly loose interpretation of the Constitution. 6' Ad-
ditionally, various cultural factors, such as a deeply embedded
"cult of technocratic expertise," increasingly are exported from
the United States to justify the "independence" of other central
banks around the globe. This fetish for technocratic expertise
holds that central banking policy is best left to the policy pro-
fessionals but ignores the danger that the technicians them-
selves may be corrupted by the trappings of self-interest. Such
concerns are often swept aside by the platitude that the Feder-
al Reserve Board is above politics and the premise that both
ordinary citizens and Congress are incapable of exercising
informed judgment in all matters dealing with central banking
policy.
16 2
The quiet dogma of an infallible, privately directed central
bank is simply incompatible with democratic theory and prac-
tice, and as such, deserves to be relegated to the past. The fact
is that the Federal Reserve System, like other modern bureau-
cratic agencies, has not been insulated from politics merely be-
cause of its quasi-independent status. Rather, the autonomy of
the Fed merely dictates a substantive outcome most favorable
to those private banking interests that have a significant insti-
tutional power base within the Federal Reserve System. Wide-
spread market failure, on-going financial bailout, increasingly
inequitable distributions of wealth and income, and secular
key Federal Reserve System officials who are accountable to the White House and
Congress by requiring that all members of the FOMC be nominated by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate).
"' For a discussion of the theoretical permutations required to bring the prac-
tice of broad congressional delegations within the requirements of the Constitution,
see supra note 67.
"62 It is a curious phenomena that so many Americans have remained unin-
formed and uninterested in hearing, let alone participating in, any public policy
debate concerning banking and finance. After all, a great many Americans are
quite ready, willing and able to understand and manage the intricacies of their
own personal finances, including the complexities of mortgage financing and diver-
sified investment strategies, to Tinimize their tax liabilities and maxinize their
personal gains in a wide variety of money market instruments. Yet these same
intelligent people are content to let unelected bureaucrats at the Fed decide the
larger financial issues that affect their lives and economic interests. See Carol M.
Dukes, Evil Science Runs Amok-Again!, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1993, at A27 ("we
are all scientists if we allow our minds to inquire and refuse to be intimidated by
the unchallenged 'experts'").
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economic stagnation are both a lesson and a warning about the
dangers of insulating the policy-making process from open pol-
itics. Limiting public policy debate to a professional class of
self-professed experts, lobbyists and professional politicians en-
trenched inside the Capitol Beltway has had disastrous results
for the American economy.
Public policy should not be dictated by a distant state
bureaucracy. It should be made by a democratically account-
able body "that relies on a continuing dialogue between public
opinion and expert opinion."' 3 That, however, requires the
restoration of an informed public and a wider civic discussion
about central banking policy. Education and debate among
ordinary American citizens is a requirement, not a luxury.
Deeper public understanding and wider public participation
and representation in the policy making process' naturally
would lead to policy outcomes that are more compatible with
the public interest. Public participation also would facilitate
the achievement of such objectives as lower real rates of inter-
est, reduced public and private deficits, greater levels of invest-
ment and employment, and public support for a more civilized
social compact to restrain inflation.
" See HAVEL, supra note 147, at 1.6 ("The referee in [any eventual central
regulation], of course, could not be a state bureaucracy but a democratically elect-
ed political body that relies on a continuing dialogue between public opinion and
expert opinion.").
Others have noted the "democratic deficit" in the emerging European Econom-
ic Community, which has required member states to "de-link" their central banks
from parliamentary control as a condition of closer monetary union. See, e.g.,
Ruben Lee, EC Investment Services Regime: The Case for Reform, EUROWATCH:
ECONOMICS, POLICY, AND LAW IN THE NEw EUROPE, Aug. 23, 1993, at 6-7. While
important policy discussions are normally confidential and decisions influenced by
informal lobbying and privileged access, it is "critical that wide and formal, rather
than discretionary, consultations take place" and that such institutional reform be
enshrined in legislation. Id.
... James K. Galbraith, Self-Fulfilling Prophets: Inflated Zeal at the Federal
Reserve, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1994, at 31, 37-39. Among the legislative reform
proposals introduced in the 1st Session of the 103d Congress to make the Federal
Reserve System more accountable to a wider range of interests in the body politic
(i.e., debtor groups such as consumers, farmers, and manufacturing businesses) and
to open up the Fed's decision-making process to greater public scrutiny are the
following: HR. 587/S. 219 (introduced by Representative Lee Hamilton and Senator
Paul Sarbanes), HR. 28 (introduced by House Banking Chairman Henry Gonzalez),
HR. 145 (introduced by Representative Phil Crane), and HR. 586/S. 212 (intro-
duced by Representative Lee Hamilton and Senator Byron Dorgan).
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POSTSCRIPT
As this Article goes to print, several late-breaking develop-
ments deserve attention and brief analysis as important exam-
ples of the continuing failure of the free-market policy ap-
proach to banking and finance. The growing speculation in
derivative financial instruments has led to stunning losses and
hardship internationally. In December 1994, Orange County,
California, one of the nation's wealthiest counties, was forced
to file for bankruptcy.6 ' Its investment fund incurred more
than $2 billion in losses on highly leveraged derivative invest-
ments after wrongly betting that interest rates would fall.'
In February 1995, Barings P.L.C., one of the world's oldest
investment banks, suddenly collapsed just days after it was
reported that a single trader in its Singapore office had lost
more than $1 billion of the bank's money in unauthorized fi-
nancial gambles on the direction of Japanese stock prices and
interest rates.' 67
The losses incurred by Barings' shareholders ultimately
may be somewhat contained by the sale of the bank's assets to
a financial suitor.6 The bankruptcy of Orange County, how-
ever, has already led to real hardship for real people: county
workers have been laid off and a wide range of public services
for taxpaying residents have been cut.'69 Orange County is
not an isolated case. Derivatives have led to mounting losses
for government agencies, schools and universities, non-profit
organizations, and corporations around the country.7 The
' Sallie Hofineister, Orange County, Calif., Makes Bankruptcy Filing, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at Al.
166 Seth Mydans, Orange County Begins Pain of Cutbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1995, at A19; Leslie Wayne, Orange County Can Meet Only 60% of Its Budget,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at Al.
167 Richard W. Stevenson, Young Trader's $29 Billion Bet Brings Down a Vener-
able Firm, Feb. 28, 1995, N.Y. TIMES, at Al; Richard W. Stevenson, Markets Shak-
en as a British Bank Takes a Big Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at Al
("[Barings] was left with no choice but to seek bankruptcy protection after a fran-
tic rescue effort by the Bank of England .. . caine up short.").
168 Richard W. Stevenson, Dutch Concern Is Set to Take Over Barings, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, § 1, at D5.
169 Hundreds of Jobs Likely to Go in Cuts by Bankrupt County, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1994, at 14.
17' G. Bruce Knecht, TV: Derivatives on "60 Minutes", WALL ST. J., Mar. 8,
1995, at A18; G. Bruce Knecht, Hit By Derivatives, Florida County Tries To Decide
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benefits of derivative investments, such as the sharing and
hedging of risk, must eventually be weighed against their
increasing costs, which include huge losses to seemingly so-
phisticated, yet unwary investors" and -significant collateral
damage to investors in tangentially related markets."
Policymakers and analysts are only beginning to understand
the potential magnitude of the risks now inherent in the global
casino economy.
These risks were illustrated by the sudden collapse of the
Mexican peso in December 1994. A financial meltdown in Mex-
ico, if not quickly contained, could have spread to neighboring
currencies and regions, affecting other emerging markets and
the value of the U.S. dollar. Rather than face the prospect of
protracted debate in Congress, President Clinton ultimately
adopted the rescue package by executive order. In February
1995, the Clinton administration committed itself to $20 billion
in emergency loans to Mexico as part of a $50 billion interna-
tional rescue package for the Mexican peso.'
Policymakers were forced to rely on arguments of political
expediency and financial necessity to justify a rescue package
that so flagrantly violated free-market principles. The Clinton
administration's authoritarian policy formulation cannot be
blamed solely on fears of partisan politics, since the growing
revolt in Congress was not confined to Republicans.' The
overriding perception of a double standard is difficult to dispel.
What To Do, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1995, at Al.
171 For instance, Proctor & Gamble Co. has joined a growing list of victims of
derivative losses. P. & G. Amends Bankers Trust Suit to Seek More Money, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1995, at D9.
172 Sheryl WuDunn, Tokyo Stocks Plunge on British Firm's Collapse, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1995, at Dl; see also Hofineister, supra note 165, at Al (the bankruptcy
filing of Orange County drove down the market for municipal bonds, and threat-
ens to "cause Wall Street firms to demand higher interest rates or to pull back on
lending to local governments").
17 David E. Sanger, Clinton Offers $20 Billion to Mexico for Peso Rescue, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at Al. The peso's decline threatened to drive down the value
of the U.S. dollar. Paul Lewis, Dollar Bruised in Stampede of Investors to Yen and
Mark, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1995, at D1; Kenneth N. Gilpin, Far-Reaching Effects
Seen if Mexico Rescue Is Halted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at Dl.
114 David E. Sanger, With Opposition Rising, Clinton Pleads for Mexico Rescue
Package, N.Y. TRIES, Jan. 19, 1995, at A21. Possibly responding to elite constitu-
encies, many Republican leaders were early supporters of the rescue package.
David E. Sanger, Leaders of G.O.P. in Congress Back Clinton on Mexico, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1995, at Al.
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When an ordinary citizen loses his or her house or business
because of foreclosure or default, it is considered the legitimate
outcome of free-market forces, although the price of credit is
not ultimately set by market forces but is administered by
central banks. If anything, the loss of a home or business, like
the loss of a job, is considered to be a sign of personal failure.
In contrast, when wealthy investors stand to lose the principal
of their investments, the government is ready and willing to
intervene to forestall a "financial crisis."
Since the regulatory regime has been dismantled and
replaced with a Darwinian free-market approach, financial
crisis has become a regular feature of the financial system.'75
Governments now intervene regularly in the private market-
place to reverse market outcomes with receivership policies
when such intervention suits the interests of the financially
elite stratum of society-the same elite which enjoys political
influence by virtue of its financial ability to contribute to elec-
tion campaigns. The proclivity of elected officials to depart
from free-market principles contrasts sharply with their dem-
onstrated unwillingness to intervene effectively on behalf of
debtor interests (representing the broad majority) or to define
a coherent public interest to justify rational regulation and
market-ordering measures.
The operation of the peso support mechanism confirms
criticism that the bailout policy is a welfare program for rich
American investors. The so-called "smart money" fled, leaving
government agencies and central banks holding a mountain of
depreciating pesos. It was reported, for instance, that funds
drawn down by the Mexican government from the U.S. Trea-
sury Department's Exchange Stabilization Fund were flowing
into Europe and the Far East, thereby depressing the value of
the dollar in those markets. As one Morgan Stanley analyst
admitted, 'There was always a danger the provision of public
capital would serve as a cover for private capital to leave the
country.""1 6 The dollar fell to historic lows against the Japa-
17 The frequent necessity of huge financial bailouts is not confined to the Unit-
ed States. Richard W. Stevenson, Bailing Out France's Biggest Bank, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 1995, at D1; Timothy A. Canova, The Swedish Model Betrayed, 37 CHAL-
LENGE: MAG. ECON. AFF. 36 (May-June 1994).
176 Paul Lewis, Dollar Falls On Fears in Peso Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995,
at D1, D15. For a discussion of the elite financial institutions which have huge
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nese yen and German mark (and also slid against the British,
French and Swiss currencies), in large part due to speculation
that the Federal Reserve would not raise interest rates177 and
that the U.S. government lacked the capability to defend the
dollar because it already had committed half of its Exchange
Stabilization Fund to Mexico. 178
For Mexico, the bailout agreement represented a major
relinquishment of its economic sovereignty, particularly its
ability to implement fundamental policies such as the setting
of domestic interest rates, which were raised sharply (to up-
wards of fifty percent) to appease the markets and the U.S.
government. 9 Amidst the panic to fashion the massive gov-
ernment bailout package, a more sensible option was ignored:
Mexico could have stabilized the peso by reimposing limited
foreign exchange restrictions. The silence of the public debate
was deafening. The American media machine paid scant atten-
tion to the few voices articulating an alternative vision of a
regulatory paradigm to replace the failing free-market mythol-
ogy.
These events confirm that the liberalization of internation-
al capital flows has created a world in which the sovereignty of
interests at stake in the Mexican financial markets, see Louis Uchitelle, U.S. Loss-
es in Mexico Assessed: Peso's Fall May Cost Americans Billions, N.Y. TIIES, Dec.
26, 1994, at 55.
17 Keith Bradsher, Dollar Falls to New Low and Fed Intervenes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1995, at D1.
17' Treasury Undersecretary Lawrence Summers tried unsuccessfully to assure
skeptical currency speculators that the remaining resources in the Exchange Stabi-
lization Fund were sufficient to support the dollar through effective market inter-
vention. David E. Sanger, Dollar Continues to Plunge as U.S. Ponders Strategy,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at Al. Summers presumably did not want to risk rat-
tling the foreign exchange markets further by mentioning any variation of his
proposed turnover tax on financial transactions (such as applying the tax to cur-
rency speculation), a compelling regulatory proposal that Summers had advocated
in his pre-Clinton administration days. See infra note 186.
17 David E. Sanger, Mexico Is Facing New Restrictions To Get U.S. Help, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at Al. In compliance with the bailout agreement, the Bank
of Mexico promptly raised its short-term interest rates to nearly 50%. Anthony
DePalma, Mexico Initiates An Economic Plan of Extended Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1995, at Al; Anthony DePalma, Rates Up Sharply in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
21, 1995, at Dl; David E. Sanger, Peso Rescue Sets New Limits on Mexico, N.Y
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at Al. Consumer interest rates have soared above 115%
annually, while salaries are expected to rise only 10 to 17% this year. Sallie
Hughes, Mexico's Middle Class Losing Ground: Soaring Interest Rates Spark
Debtors' Rights Groups, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 26, 1995, at 22A.
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any one nation is surrendered to the forces of private financial
speculation. Capital is capable of staging a general political
strike against the policies of any nation state, including the
United States, by simply voting against that country's currency
and bonds in the private marketplace. In the United States, for
example, some analysts recognize that even Federal Reserve
Board policy is subject to the veto-power of the international
capital markets.180
While the total volume of U.S. exports and imports has
reached about one trillion dollars per year, foreign exchange
trading now adds up to roughly one trillion dollars each
day."' When speculators vote against a country's economic
policies by selling assets denominated in that country's curren-
cy, the country's central bank can respond only by raising the
domestic rate of interest.182 This solution often is ineffective
in its intended purpose and always damages the country's do-
mestic economy. 83 More than sixty years ago, the world's
premier economic mind, John Maynard Keynes, warned that
nothing less than the democratic experiment in self-govern-
ment was endangered by the threat of global financial market
forces.8 4
' See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Latest Rate Hike by the Fed Makes White House
Nervous, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, at 26 ("Some officials even fear that public
criticisms [of Fed policy]", let alone criticism of the Fed's undemocratic structure,
"would prompt the Fed to push interest rates even higher to reassure financial
markets of its continued independence.").
181 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF THE U.S.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKE TURNOVER SURVEY (Apr. 1992).
1"2 Sanger, supra note 178, at Al ("But the solution that the markets appeared
to be demanding, another increase in [U.S.] interest rates to lure foreign investors
to buy dollars again, is fraught with economic and political problems for the Fed-
eral Reserve and the White House."); Plunge in the Dollar Could Spark Upheaval
in Markets, Economies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at Al (if the Federal Reserve
tries "to rescue the dollar by raising interest rates and fails, financial events could
spin out of control"); Keith Bradsher, Dollar's Four-Day Plunge Halts, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1995, at Al.
1" See James D. Robinson HI, Inflation Overkill, FOREIGN AFF., SeptJOct. 1994,
at 2; Canova, supra note 175, at 38-39. Opposition to high interest rates by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers demon-
strates the growing split between industrial and financial interests. Louis
Uchitelle, Industry Leaders Warn Against Rise in Interest Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 1994, at 1; Jerry J. Jasinowski, The Case Against Further Money Tightening,
CHALLENGE, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 9.
184 John M. Keynes, National Self-Sufficiency, 22 YALE REV. 755, 762 (1933) (let
trade be global, Keynes wrote, but "above all let finance be primarily national").
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TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. BANMING AND FINANCE
Any program intended to regain a country's sovereignty
over its own money and currency policy requires the regulation
of private speculation. A return to fixed exchange rates could
provide a framework for controlling wide speculative fluctua-
tions. 1" Alternatively, the implementation of even a modest
tax on international currency transactions, similar to the
"Tobin tax" proposed by Nobel-laureate economist Dr. James
Tobin, could provide a powerful market disincentive to unnec-
essary speculation in currency trading while raising billions of
dollars in revenue."' In March 1995, at the World Summit
for Social Development, French President Francois Mitterand
supported the Tobin tax as a way of raising money, preventing
financial speculation, and regaining some degree of economic
sovereignty. This was a fitting stance from the first significant
victim of the globalization of finance. In the early 1980s, the
new Mitterand government surrendered an ambitious
Keynesian social agenda when the value of the French franc
crumbled in the face of speculative attack.
It is clear that there exists a compelling alternative para-
digm to the current free-market approach to banking and fi-
nance. This emerging paradigm extols the virtues of a regula-
tory regime that would reorder the marketplace to achieve a
range of crucial policy goals: low real interest rates; price sta-
bility; sustained economic growth and job creation; the preven-
Keynes developed a plan for "financial disarmament," which included proposals for
an International Clearing Union and central bank control of foreign exchange
transactions. See also James Crotty, On Keynes and Capital Flight, 21 J. ECON.
LITERATURE, Mar. 1983, at 62.
18 Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker (an early architect of high real interest
rates), recently headed a commission of distinguished scholars that atoned for past
transgressions by calling for a return to a Bretton Woods-type system of fixed
exchange rates, with wider bands for fluctuations of currency values. Bretton
Woods Comm'n, Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future (Wash. D.C., July 1994).
186 DAvID FELIX, THE TOBIN TAX PROPOSAL: BACKGROUND, ISSUES AND PROS-
PECTS (U.N. Development Programme for the World Summit for Social Develop-
ment Policy Paper Mar. 1995) (citing James Tobin, A Proposal for International
Monetary Reform, Presidential Address Before the Eastern Economic Association, in
1978 EASTERN ECON. J. 153); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers,
When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transac-
tions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 261-81 (1989); see also James Tobin, On the Effi-
ciency of the Financial System, LLOYDS BANK REV. (July 1984); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Using Tax Policy To Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES.,
101-15 (1989) (as a member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers,
Stiglitz, like Summers, has been largely silent in public on these issues).
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tion and avoidance of financial crisis; and greater political
accountability. However, those who favor such a "paradigm
shift" are confronted with a systematic political challenge.
Alternative voices are not heard precisely when policy options
are considered and adopted, most probably because those voic-
es are overwhelmed by the urgency of the moment and the
powers of vested interests. Even those who favor the prevailing
free-market dogma may well remember that a democracy that
lacks effective and informed public debate during times of
crisis is no longer master of its own fate, but an organism at
the mercy of outside forces.
